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The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of International affairs. Any opinions expressed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER, 1927

DR. D. G. HOGARTH

BEFORE the meeting at the Institute on November 8th, 1927, Mr. Headlam-Morley, in referring to the recent death of Dr. Hogarth, said: I think that you will all desire that before we pass on to the business of the evening we should pause for a moment to place on record the very deep regret which we, with so many other societies, feel at the death of one of our most valued members. Dr. Hogarth's life-work was that of a scholar, a teacher, a writer, and a traveller. In all of those spheres he excelled, and when the opportunity was given to him he showed in the greater affairs of the world the qualities of a statesman and administrator. With other archæological colleagues, among whom I would mention especially Miss Gertrude Bell, whose recent death is so great a loss, and Colonel Lawrence, he was enabled to take a prominent and even a directing part in what we may call almost the one joyous adventure of the War.

But here we think of Dr. Hogarth especially as a personal friend and as a member of this Institute. He was one of our original members. I am not quite certain, but I believe that he was present at the meeting in the Hôtel Majestic at Paris when the Institute was founded. From the very beginning he was one of our most active, vigorous and helpful participants. In the debates, whether he was in the chair or in the body of the meeting, no one was listened to with more attention than he was. That was partly because of the profound knowledge he had of the affairs of the Near East and the Arabic nations, and partly also because of his wide experience, his sane judgment and his mellowed wisdom. I remember particularly more than one occasion on which he intervened with very great effect in a rather heated discussion on the difficult subject of Zionism.

But a great deal of his work for the Institute was done behind the scenes and was of a nature of which most members of the Institute would not be cognisant. He had a profound knowledge of everything that had to do with the production of books. From the beginning he was on the Publications Committee, which has a great deal of not unimportant work to do. He contributed very weighty articles to the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, and constantly gave his advice and superintendence in connection with the production of the annual *Survey of International Affairs*. In all matters connected with the publications of the Institute I think we may say there was no one to whom we turned with such confidence. We were always glad when any difficult matter, whether of business or of scholarship, could be referred to him for decision. I really hardly know how we shall get on without him. It was in intercourse with him about these matters that I came to feel the profound justice of an observation made about him by Colonel Lawrence in his well-known book. I quote from memory. I am not quite certain whether the words appear in the published form; I rather think that they were eliminated by Dr. Hogarth himself. Speaking of the great period of the Arab Bureau in Egypt, Lawrence, after enumerating the other members, says: "Hogarth was the guide, the mentor and the father of us all," and I think that nothing could better express the feeling which, as one got to know him better, one had for him.

There is one particular point in his character to which in conclusion I would like to refer. He had a quality which he shared with so many of the greatest scholars of Oxford and Cambridge. He was never reluctant to place his great store of knowledge and his wide experience at the service of others working in the same field. There was no man of whom it could be said more truly that he never thought of himself, but only of the work in which he and his colleagues were co-operating. I think that there are many of us here who feel that with his death the world has become appreciably poorer and appreciably darker. There has gone with him knowledge which cannot be recalled; a light has gone out which will never be rekindled, and for many of us a friend has been lost who can never be replaced.

NAVAL DISARMAMENT

(Record of Address by the Right Hon. W. C. Bridgeman, M.P., the First Lord of the Admiralty, on October 20th, 1927, and the discussion following.)

THE RIGHT HON. W. BRIDGEMAN said that he would try to give his impressions of the Conference at Geneva. No doubt they would be thought to be very biassed; but he could only speak the truth as it seemed to him, and his listeners would, of course, make allowances for anything that might appear to them to be prejudiced.

First of all he would like to describe the personnel of the three Delegations. It had often been said that the Conference would have been a greater success if it had not been dominated by naval technical experts. He did not think that those who said that could be fully aware who the delegates were.

From Japan there was Viscount Saito, the remarkably successful Governor of Korea, who had had a very great civilian as well as naval career. There was also Viscount Ishii, whose experience as Ambassador in Paris entitled him to claim a very wide outlook on all international affairs.

From this country there were two Cabinet Ministers, neither of whom was of an excessively bellicose nature, namely, Lord Cecil and himself. As Lord Cecil said in a recent letter to the Prime Minister, the two Ministers never had any difference of opinion at Geneva on any point of the slightest importance. There was also Admiral Field, who of all admirals in the world he thought might be regarded as having a wide outlook.

The American Delegation consisted of two admirals and one diplomat. If it was a fact that naval experts predominated in the Conference, it was in the American Delegation and not in either of the others that they did so. He thought that he could say quite truthfully (it had been said by the Japanese and he agreed with them) that it was a great drawback that the representatives of the United States, which called the Conference, were not men who were able of themselves to play the part of plenipotentiaries without perpetual reference to their officials and statesmen at home. That made the Conference very much more difficult. Both the other countries were represented by men

who were in a position to take a great deal of authority upon themselves.

As to the attitude of each of the three Delegations when they came to the Conference, he would like to say how it appeared to him.

The American Delegation came, he thought, quite unprepared for anything except a very crude proposal for the extension of the ratio established at Washington in 1921-22. He did not think that they had studied the question beyond that, and he believed that they were quite unmindful of the fact that at the Washington Conference any agreement on the subject of cruisers was postponed owing to the very great difficulty of arriving at a formula which was suitable to all three countries. They came to Geneva apparently thinking that it was the simplest thing in the world, although it had proved impossible at Washington, to come to some formula which would settle the question of cruisers. The Americans, he thought, also came with the idea of establishing what they called parity and with the intention, if possible, of getting it by persuading other countries to diminish their security in order that they themselves might get parity without having to spend a great deal of money. He was not blaming them; he was merely saying what he thought was their attitude.

Japan put forward a proposal which practically meant that the *status quo* would remain for a considerable period. It became clear as things went on that what they wanted was a rather better ratio as against the United States than 3 to 5. They certainly wanted more submarines. They did not want to spend very much money at the present time—certainly nothing beyond their existing programme. They wanted to save up their money for the time when the period covered by the Washington Agreement expired.

The attitude of the British Delegation was rather different from that of the other two countries. They went to Geneva with a disarmament proposal which would have involved far greater economies than either of the other Delegations proposed. They suggested that in the future there should be a large reduction in the size of battleships and that there should be an extension of their life. Those suggestions alone would probably have saved something like fifty millions to each country. They proposed that the ratio of 5, 5, 3 established at Washington should be established for cruisers of the largest type. They also proposed that a maximum of tonnage and armament should be fixed for

all classes of ships below that. Every one of those proposals would have produced an enormous economy in the future and, as he thought, the only economy deserving of the name which was proposed at the Conference. The American proposal would have in some cases led to a very great increase of expense. The Americans put a very high figure on the maximum tonnage of some of the smaller craft, and their scheme for total tonnage, without any description of how the total tonnage was to be made up, was one that must have led immediately to competition and to extra expense.

When the Conference had its first meeting the countries propounded their several schemes. The American plan was the simple one of extending the ratio to all other craft. They laid down themselves what they thought everybody else ought to have. The Japanese plan was never followed out at all. It was that the countries should mark time in the position in which they at present were. The British plan was that, without seeking any very hard-and-fast formula, each country should say what it wanted for the purposes of defence alone and why it wanted it. The British Delegation thought that if that could be stated they would probably all be able to agree to each other's requirements. It would have avoided the consideration of a formula which had never yet been discovered, it would have enabled them to reduce all aggressive and offensive strength by an enormous amount in all three countries, and would have set an example to the whole world.

No sooner had the British Delegation made their proposals than an immediate onslaught was made upon them by an enormous part of the American Press, uncontrolled, as it seemed to him, by the American Delegation. The British battleship proposal was criticised on the ground that it was a deep-laid plot to give Great Britain a permanent superiority. It was said that the two latest British battleships, the *Nelson* and the *Rodney*, were much larger than others and that they were an attempt to give this country a permanent superiority. The history of the *Nelson* and the *Rodney* was entirely forgotten by the Americans. Those ships were built under the Washington Agreement. They were built in order to try to get as near to equality as was possible after the Americans had built ships of a larger size than the Japanese. There was no attempt to steal a march, because everybody at Washington knew that this country was going to build the *Nelson* and the *Rodney*, and everybody knew what the result would be. The British Delegation said that they were

prepared to agree to any adjustment which would preserve the position in regard to battleships which was arrived at by the Washington Conference. Their battleship proposal, although it was immediately and violently and most unfairly attacked by the American Press, commended itself at once to the Japanese. He remembered Viscount Ishii saying to him, "I have a Treasury mind in these matters, and it is appealed to by this, and I think that there is a great deal in it." The Japanese Delegation came out quite strongly in favour of it. The Americans, who had at first given it a most chilly reception, after getting some information (he supposed from home) became more favourable to it, and even agreed that if some settlement could be come to on all the other points they would be prepared to pass some Resolution embodying the idea.

After the first Plenary Conference the Delegations settled down in the Technical Committee to work out the various proposals and see how far they could agree upon them. They were worked out somewhat on the basis of the British proposals. First of all the Delegations decided what auxiliary ships it was not necessary to include in any agreement at all. On that a settlement was arrived at. Then they went on to the question of submarines and destroyers, and decided what should be the maximum size of those in two classes, the leaders and the ordinary ships. The British Delegation had fixed maxima for those classes at roughly speaking the present size. But, for some reason or other, both the other countries raised the maxima by a few hundred tons or a hundred tons in each case, and in order to get an agreement the British Delegation agreed to that. He only mentioned that to show that the British proposal was the more economical. The Delegations got on some way to agreement on all those points.

They then came to what everybody knew from the beginning was going to be the crux, namely, the cruiser question. It was the crux. The Americans all through kept on saying that the Conference must fix a total tonnage and that the amount of cruisers each country was to have was to be expressed in a total tonnage. This country was, he believed, to have 400,000 tons. But the British Delegation could never get the American Delegation to say how that tonnage was to be made up—whether it was to be composed of the highest size of cruiser or how many there were to be of one type or how many of another. They said, "You have to say what tonnage you will agree to before we say how it is to be composed, if we say at all." In that lay the whole

difficulty of the situation. At the Washington Conference in his opinion a great mistake was made by fixing the maximum size of cruisers at 10,000 tons and the armament at 8-inch guns. If they had been fixed then at a lower tonnage and with 6-inch guns an enormous saving would have been effected. The point which the British Delegation elaborated the whole time, and which it seemed impossible for them to get their colleagues to understand, was that if a maximum was fixed it nearly always became the standard, and therefore it was necessary to be careful not to fix too high a maximum. That was the case before the War with regard to Dreadnoughts. Great Britain began to build Dreadnoughts. Then Germany built the equivalents. Then Great Britain had super-Dreadnoughts. Again Germany had the same. That opened up a whole vista of competition, because each country felt obliged to be equal in the highest class to the other countries or to get as near as it could to the other countries which it regarded as possible rivals.

Very soon after the 10,000 tons size was fixed at Washington the Japanese began to build ships of that size with 8-inch guns, or at any rate they began to build a considerable number of ships with 8-inch guns whether they were all 10,000 tons or not. The result was that other countries which built cruisers felt that they must do the same, because the naval view was that it was murder, or very nearly so, to send out men in a cruiser carrying 6-inch guns to fight against one with 8-inch guns. Therefore the maximum, in experience, had always been the standard.

What the British Delegation wanted to avoid and what they fought hard for at Geneva was to prevent so high a maximum being fixed. They said, "We will agree to the ratio of a certain number of these large 10,000-ton 8-inch-gun cruisers; but when we have got to that figure let everything after that built by all countries be smaller tonnage and only carry a 6-inch gun." That they never could get the Americans to agree to. The United States Delegation never gave the reasons why they wanted to have such a large number of 8-inch gun cruisers. He personally felt that if the British Delegation were to agree, under the guise of a Conference on Limitation, to a high maximum size without any limit in numbers, they would be agreeing to something which would not reduce the cost of warships but would enormously increase it. He for one could not have gone to a Conference on Limitation to sign an agreement which would in his opinion have had the effect of largely increasing the offensive strength of not only the navies of the countries at the Conference but also the

navies of other countries. That was the great difficulty. The Americans came one day to the Technical Committee and said that they must have twenty-five of the large 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers, that they would allow Great Britain to have 400,000 tons in that class, and that they could not reduce themselves below twenty-five unless Great Britain went below 400,000 total tonnage. It was denied in the Press that they had made that proposal; but there was no doubt whatever about it. He had it in black and white. It was a very great shock to the British Delegation when they heard it. It was common knowledge that this country required numbers rather than great size. It had an enormous length of trade routes to protect, it had an enormous perimeter of shore of the Empire to defend, and numbers were of far more importance to it than size. If under a limit of 400,000 tons America were to build twenty-five of those cruisers, taking up 250,000 tons, and if this country were to have parity with it, it would only leave it 150,000 tons for the whole of the cruisers it would require for the protection of its trade routes. The British Delegation never could get the American Delegation to understand that England was in a totally different position from America both as an insular country and as possessing a far-spread imperial dominion. They never could get them to understand that if it were shut off from its supplies at sea this country would starve in two or three months, whereas the United States could go on for an unlimited time under similar circumstances.

Another matter in which the position of England was different from that of America was in regard to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean problem, which was so vital to England, was of very little consequence to America. Although the statement was repeated *ad nauseam*, the British Delegation seemed quite unable to convince the American Delegation of the special position in which this country was placed. He remembered very well a remark made one day by Admiral Jones, a most charming man but an extremely strenuous supporter of his own point of view. The question of food supplies was being discussed, and he said, "I cannot understand quite why you attach so much importance to food supplies. If you had a war you could easily get your food from somewhere else." In answer to the question, "Where?" Admiral Jones replied, "You could get it from Russia." The British Delegation did not feel very much reassured by the prospect of the position of this country after a blockade of a few weeks!

When the Conference got to a deadlock on the question of

cruisers it was very difficult to know what to do. They all hoped, although they were not very sanguine, that they would find some possible way out. He remembered being urged by Lord Cecil to press for a Plenary Session of the whole Conference in public, when the British Delegation would be able to state its case once more and to point out to the public what the differences were. That was opposed at the time by the United States and not smiled upon by the Japanese, who thought that the effect of it might be to advertise the difficulties of the Conference rather than bring it nearer to a solution. Then there was proposed a plan which was called either "The Boy Scouts Movement" or "The Young Men's Christian Association." That was because somebody said, "If you get these admirals and statesmen and bigoted people out of the way, some of these minor members of the Delegations will, with much fresher, clearer, and better-in-every-way minds than the rest of them, find some solution." So the "Y.M.C.A." set to work and sat up late at night devising a new plan based on a programme for a certain number of years. The first night was rather a stormy one. The second night they began to get to business and it appeared rather possible that some solution on those lines might be discovered. When it appeared so he sent a message to the United States Delegation to say, "We now seem to have started a rather more hopeful line," and to say that if they would like it he would be glad to postpone the Plenary Conference which he had asked for on a certain day until a day or two later, if they could say that they thought, as he did, that the suggestion offered a hopeful method of solution. The Americans refused to give him a definite answer; but they said that if he wanted the Conference postponed he could have it postponed. He did not want it postponed unless he could be assured that a good result would come. The Conference was going to take place on the following day; but unfortunately the murder of Mr. O'Higgins intervened, and out of respect for his memory as one of the members of the Conference the meeting was postponed for two days. Then the second Plenary Conference took place. In that Conference the Delegations all more or less restated their position in view of what had transpired in the Technical Committees up till then. The British Delegation were prepared to agree that Great Britain would mark time in the building of the large cruisers until the United States had come to an equality with it, and would not proceed with one Class "A" cruiser on which it had already begun to spend money. The Japanese were not at all unfriendly; but the

British Delegation could get no sort of response that gave them any great encouragement from the United States Delegation. At that meeting the chief American Delegate said, "The real difference in this Conference is between the British and the Japanese. They are the villains of the piece. If they can get together, then the United States will have no difficulty in completing the triangle." He thought that that was the expression that was used. The British Delegation thought, "Well, here is another chance," and they proceeded to work very hard with the Japanese, who were very anxious to get to an agreement. They went on for some days with great hopes, and they worried the matter out with the Japanese and got to very substantial agreement on all important points. That was the moment when the Conference was suspended and the British Delegates were asked to come home and confer with His Majesty's Government. They came home and spent three or four days discussing the matter with the Cabinet. He was afraid that he must not describe exactly what happened then, although it was nothing very exciting. The result was that they went back to Geneva with orders to proceed on the lines they were on at the moment they left, and they did. They had another discussion with the Japanese, and came to an agreement except on very trifling points which could not have been sustained by either side for long. Then, having been given to understand that if they could agree the United States would do the same, the British Delegation proceeded to submit their proposals to the Delegates of the United States. Then they found that the attitude of the United States had very much hardened. Like Pharaoh, they hardened their hearts and they would not let total tonnage, in their sense of the words, go. They refused the proposal, although it had been agreed to in all essential points by the Japanese, on the ground that it still gave this country too large a total tonnage. Then there was nothing more to be done. He made one more effort. He suggested that the countries should at any rate sign an agreement on the points of the smaller ships and on the points on which all three countries had come to terms.

On the 4th August he said :

"Even if there is for the present no apparent prospect of coming to a complete agreement about small cruisers, it would be most unfortunate if the Conference were to separate without arriving at some international arrangements tending to economy. A large measure of agreement has already been reached with regard to 10,000-ton cruisers, flotilla leaders, destroyers and submarines.

It seems to us that a similar agreement might well be reached with regard to battleships. These results are not all that had been hoped for, but they are of great value, and it would be an international misfortune if they were lost on the present occasion. Sooner than see the Conference wholly fail, we are authorised to sign an agreement even if it embodied only points on which provisional agreement has already been reached by the three Delegations."

He had given in a few words as faithful an historical account as he could of the setting of the Conference and of the proceedings as they went on from day to day. Now in regard to the result. It had been said that the Conference was spoiled by there being too many naval experts present at it, and that if there had only been there a few people who were determined to have peace and who had no other particular idea in their minds, everything would have been all right. Those who said that made the assumption that they were the only people who were determined to have peace. To find anybody who did not want peace would be a difficulty which anybody would find it very hard to surmount. To suggest that those who happened to be technical experts were enemies to peace was most unfair to them and was, in fact, deliberately false. If that was established as a fact, as he was quite sure it was, the statement that there must only be people who knew nothing about the subject they were discussing present at a Conference of the kind seemed to him almost too childish to waste any time over. He merely mentioned it in order to repudiate the idea that the fact of anyone being a technical expert made him at once a swashbuckling, sword-rattling, flag-waving militarist.

Another accusation that was made, and that was, he thought, much more capable of being sustained, was that if there had been more diplomatic preparation for the Conference there would have been a better chance of success. That was an open question and one which would never now be decided; but he ventured to express the view that if the British proposals had been ventilated sooner than they were, and some time before the Conference, they would have suffered at least as much if not more from the attacks of the newspapers, many of whom were quite determined that the Conference should not be a success. That on the whole was his opinion, although it was not a matter on which one could dogmatise. Many of the newspapers being determined to upset the Conference and many of them, as he thought, disinclined to take an impartial view, he could not believe that the Conference

would have had a much better chance of success than it had.

Now he would say something with which, he dare say, many people would disagree. It was that no harm had been done by a public and free exchange of opinions between the countries which were represented at the Conference. He certainly was bitterly disappointed at the reception accorded to the British proposals when he put them forward. It had never occurred to him that they would be condemned before they were even discussed. He did not think that any of the three countries realised fully all the difficulties of finding a formula suitable for three countries with such absolutely different conditions. He did not consider that any harm had been done by a frank explanation of policy and the reasons for it.

Another reason that made him think that no harm had been done was that the Conference did actually reach agreement on a very large number of points. The biggest point of all, the one that would involve the greatest economy, namely, the reduction in the size, and the extension of the life, of battleships in the future, was one as to which he was quite certain that in a little time the Conference could have reached an agreement, and it was one on which he still believed agreement would be reached before the time came to reconsider the Washington Agreement. Therefore he thought that great good had been done in that direction.

As to the question of parity, the attitude of the British Delegation at Geneva was that if the United States wished to have as large a navy as Great Britain had, this country was not going to dispute its claim to have it, and that it was not for Great Britain either to justify it or impugn it. The United States could have built whatever it liked subject to the Washington Conference without calling a Conference at Geneva at all. He certainly thought that dwelling on the question of parity was not advantageous, and that the proper line for both countries was to say what they wanted for their own defence. It was perfectly obvious that the conditions differed very much. One country might want more cruisers, another country might want more destroyers, and another country might want more submarines. But if there was going to be parity exactly, ship for ship, a certain number of countries would have to have what they did not want and would have to spend money that they did not want to spend. He agreed very much with what Lord Grey said in a letter some little time ago to the effect that parity really meant competition. It would be far better to start on the assumption that there was not the

slightest chance of war between this country and the United States and that, therefore, all that had to be done was for each country to consider what it was going to have for its own defence and to state it and undertake that it would not exceed it. Those seemed to him at the time to be the right lines, and he still believed them to be the right lines.

The Conference left off without coming to any decision; but he would far rather leave off like that than arrive at some formula which might afterwards be found to mean different things to different countries and which it might be found almost impossible to make fair for everybody. There was very good reason to suppose that it would be possible to reconsider these matters within the next two or three years or so before the time came for reconsideration of the Washington Agreement. He for one believed that the frank talk which had taken place had not done any harm, but had probably done more good than anything else could have done in the direction of ultimately getting an arrangement which would be far more satisfactory than any formula arrived at by a process of concessions on one side or the other which would not really have met the circumstances and the needs of the different countries.

He hoped that he had said enough to show that the members of the Conference made a very great effort in the cause of Disarmament, and that they were not pessimists as to the opportunity of renewing it at some future time.

MR. H. B. LEES SMITH, M.P., said that Mr. Bridgeman had pointed out that the difficulty which practically brought the Conference to an end was the difficulty with regard to the number of cruisers. The number upon which the British Delegation insisted throughout was seventy. It would be instructive to know more in detail how that number was arrived at. During the Conference Lord Jellicoe explained that at the beginning of the late war we had 114 cruisers, and that they were inadequate to hunt down the *Emden*, the *Carlsruhe*, and four other German cruisers. His argument certainly led to the conclusion that we ought to have at least 700, and proved a great deal too much. The only information which the general public had on the question was that just before the Election of 1923 the Admiralty stated that they thought that fifty-two cruisers were sufficient for the defence of this country. It would be interesting to know why the number fifty-two should be increased to seventy at a Conference for naval reduction. It was not numbers that mattered to the Americans, but size. Small cruisers were of little use to them. The whole world was covered with British bases; but America was in a different position in that regard and therefore she wanted 10,000-ton cruisers which could

last upon the seas. America could put forward as good an argument for 10,000-ton cruisers as this country could for 7,500-ton cruisers. It claimed twenty-five such cruisers. Mr. Bridgeman thought that this was unreasonable. But the British Admiralty laid it down that a battle fleet required five cruisers for every three battleships. The American fleet would consist of fifteen battleships, and therefore twenty-five cruisers was the allotment which all naval opinion regarded as reasonable.

Mr. Bridgeman had stated that there would now be a year or two in which to consider the matter, and that no doubt there would be something in the nature of another Conference before the present Washington Agreement terminated. That encouraged him (the speaker) to raise a question which was fundamental to the whole of our naval policy. The arrival of our merchant ships was vital to this country. If for any cause the 300 merchant ships which are always reaching our ports were held up for two or three months, nothing but sheer naked surrender would be the result. If that were so, was it still wise that this country should be the chief opponent in the world of an alteration in naval law which would make interference with those merchant ships an illegal act, and which would probably combine against those who interfered with them the neutral nations of the world? The present law with regard to capture at sea gave this country an enormous striking power; but it was built upon a foundation so brittle, so perilous, that the terror of what might happen if it cracked could be seen in every speech made on our behalf at Geneva. It seemed to him that the question should be re-examined in view of the fact that if we were going to retain the supremacy in competition with the United States we had to retain it against a Power which had five times our national wealth. The experience of the late War should be taken into account. During that War Holland and Denmark were neutral, and we were able to ration them; but supposing that we were at war with France we should not be able to ration Spain and Italy and Germany. The situation had altered. It was the law of blockade which prevented naval reduction and agreement with the United States. If we accepted the world's view of the matter an agreement would certainly be very easy. One element in the agreement with the United States might be, that the two countries should enter into a Treaty under which each would come to the assistance of the other if its merchant ships were interfered with at any time of war.

DR. MAXWELL GARNETT wished to ask two questions. He understood Mr. Bridgeman to say that in his view there was not the slightest risk of war between this country and the United States, and that the latter country should be allowed to build what it liked so far as we were concerned. Perhaps the First Lord would wish to qualify that statement a little, because even if this country were not directly affected by American naval construction, what the United States built might affect other nations' navies, and so indirectly affect us.

The first question he wished to ask was the following : Why was it not possible to let America build twenty-five 10,000-ton cruisers and to spend the rest of her 400,000 tons in building such cruisers as she might like to have, and for this country to build all the smaller cruisers required by the Admiralty to protect our trade routes even though we should not then have enough tonnage over to match the twenty-five American 10,000-ton cruisers? If there was no risk of our fighting America, why could not we let her have the big fighting cruisers and be content ourselves with having smaller ones for trade protection? It seemed to him that it must be very difficult for the Americans to make the Middle West understand the difference between arithmetical parity and maritime parity.

Secondly, was it not essential to look at the question as a whole and to realise that, while a few more ships in the Indian Ocean or in the Gulf of Mexico might save our precarious food supply, that would not be much good if continental air forces were meanwhile at work destroying the centre of the Empire? It was worth while surely to make some sacrifice of our naval security if we could thereby increase our total security by getting a reduction of armaments all round.

ADMIRAL SIR SYDNEY FREMANTLE asked Mr. Bridgeman whether he thought that the Americans ever intended the Conference to be successful. Probably he would say that it would be an indiscretion on the part of a Cabinet Minister if he were to answer that question. It seemed to him (the speaker) an open question whether President Coolidge in his desire to acquire for himself and his party as many votes as possible was not trying very hard to placate two parties whose policies were mutually antagonistic, the Little Navy Party and the Spread-eagle Party. If that was his idea he had achieved a most brilliant success. He placated the first party by summoning the Conference, and the second by ensuring that the Conference should prove abortive.

COMMANDER THE HON. J. M. KENWORTHY, M.P., said that the fact of the matter was that the First Lord and his naval experts had to make bricks without straw, and that was the trouble. We had 114 cruisers at the beginning of the War and we had all our Allies' cruisers available as well. Germany had practically no overseas bases. Such as she had were reduced immediately. The submarine was an unknown quantity at the beginning of the War and the German staff made ill use of it. Yet only four cruisers sank 200,000 tons of British shipping and 30,000 tons of Allied shipping. Later on in the War three disguised merchant ships got out on to the trade routes and they sank 250,000 tons of British shipping and 39,000 tons of Allied shipping. A total of seven ships accounted for that tremendous loss of shipping. The submarines when they began to be used to an unlimited degree, as the French Staff said that they were going to use

the submarine in any future war in which they were engaged, sank over 7,000,000 tons, mostly British. Yet our supremacy at sea at that time was overwhelming. The Admiralty to-day was set a problem which it was impossible for it to solve. The fault lay with the British Government and in the last resort with the British people. Every year more and more of our land went out of cultivation, and we were becoming every year more dependent on sea-borne supplies. It would be impossible with the available money to maintain such a navy as would be able to safeguard all our trade routes in all parts of the world against any possible enemy.

There were four navies which counted besides our own, those of America, France, Italy and Japan. Mr. Bridgeman had told them that there was not the slightest chance of a war between this country and the United States. A war with France would be determined in the air long before the navies could fire a gun. A war with Italy would be decided in the Mediterranean. We held both entrances. It was not against either of those two navies that the seventy cruisers were required. There remained Japan. Japan was on the flank of our Pacific possessions. She had a considerable navy. Would seventy cruisers be sufficient to bring Japan to her knees in the only way in which we could bring her to her knees, namely, by blockade? They were insufficient to blockade Japan to the point of surrender, and at the same time they were altogether insufficient to guard our trade routes against the Japanese raiders, especially submarine raiders, that would operate all over the Pacific.

What was to be done? He suggested that we should get our food from the United States and from Canada and that America should guarantee it. The two navies between them could do it. We should give up certain things, our right of blockade and so on, and should say to America, "You must guarantee our food supply." England and America could control the greater part of the wheat of the world, nearly all the rubber, nearly all the oil, all the copper, all the tin, all the zinc, nearly all the cotton, and most of the wool. It would take the whole of the time between now and 1931 not only to make the diplomatic exchanges with America, but also to educate public opinion in this country. A hundred years of propaganda for a powerful navy would have to be reversed. The work of the Blue Water School for the last hundred years would have to be undone. Otherwise the naval rivalry which had led to war between this country and Spain, Holland, France and Germany might end in a war between ourselves and America.

THE RIGHT HON. W. BRIDGEMAN, replying to the discussion, said that it had been insisted upon that there was nothing unreasonable in the Americans asking for twenty-five 10,000-ton cruisers. He dare say that that might be so; but when one was invited to a Conference and asked to sign an agreement for the limitation of armaments, was

it altogether ingenuous to sign a document which he knew must lead to a very great increase? Twenty-five such large cruisers was very nearly twice as much as any country had at the present time.

Dr. Maxwell Garnett had said, "Why not let them have their twenty-five large cruisers while we build our seventy, or whatever it is we want, of smaller ones?" But what was done by America would affect what other countries did, and if the 8-gun cruiser of the largest type was to be the standard it would be murder to send our men to sea in 6-inch gun cruisers. It was useless to ask this country to sign an agreement to allow other countries to build large ships while we ourselves were to go on sending to sea ships which were absolutely useless.

Admiral Fremantle had asked him whether the Americans ever intended to agree. That was a matter about which he (Mr. Bridgeman) had never been quite certain. He certainly did not propose to answer the question.

He wished to say in conclusion how admirably he was supported in Geneva by the representatives of the other parts of the Empire who were present, and how very satisfactory it was for the British Delegation to feel all along, step by step, that they were working in complete agreement. It certainly was a matter of very great satisfaction to find how easy it was, in spite of the great number of Delegates, for the Empire to speak on this matter with one voice.

THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE: PROSPECTS OF PRACTICAL RESULTS

*(Record of an address given by Sir Arthur Salter, K.C.B.,
Director of the Economic Section of the League of Nations, on
October 18th, 1927, together with the discussion following.)*

SIR ARTHUR SALTER said that his subject was not the World Economic Conference in general and all that it did, but the prospects of practical results from it. It might, however, be convenient briefly to remind the meeting of what the Conference was and what it recommended. It was two years since the League of Nations decided that the time had arrived when it would be useful to have a world conference to discuss the general economic condition of the world and, if possible, to discover what lines of policy were the best for the world to pursue in the interest of prosperity and peace. The League had had before it for several years the project of such a Conference, but had felt, and he thought rightly, that there was need to be extremely cautious before taking so hazardous a step as calling a World Economic Conference to discuss problems which were very wide in range, very complex in character, and very controversial. It was felt that there was little chance of securing any useful result unless the time were very carefully chosen. The conditions for the choice of the time were fairly clear.

In the first place, from the years 1919 or 1920 to 1924 the principal factor in the world international situation and the principal impediment to international trade consisted in the fluctuations of European currencies, and it was felt that it would be useless to have an economic conference while currency fluctuations were still the primary factor. The League, by precept at the Brussels Conference and by example in Austria and in Hungary, had already done what it could to help Europe to return to a position of financial stability and nothing useful could be added by further conference. While currencies were in disorder there was little prospect of discussing economic problems under normal conditions with any hope of a useful result.

In the second place, it was felt that so long as a big political and financial problem like Reparations or the Inter-Allied Debt problem occupied the forefront there was, again, little hope of

useful results. In the third place, obviously the general political atmosphere had to be favourable. In the summer of 1925 it looked, for the first time, as if the three conditions which he had indicated were reasonably fulfilled. Currency fluctuations had then ceased to be a primary factor in international trade; the Reparations settlement had just been effected at the London Conference following the Dawes Committee, and the Inter-Allied Debt settlement looked like making real progress. There was also an obvious political improvement in the general European situation which shortly afterwards found its reflection at Locarno. In those circumstances the League decided to prepare for a conference, but for the reasons which he had mentioned it felt that the preparation must be of a very special and careful kind. The Council of the League appointed a Preparatory Committee which was in its composition and character almost a miniature international conference. It consisted of twenty-one nationalities whose thirty-five representatives had a very wide range of qualification and competence. The preparation consisted partly of a study of the different problems likely to be discussed by the Conference, but the object of the preparation was, to an even more important extent, perhaps, to interest the public opinion of the world and create a proper atmosphere. Those two objects were very usefully and very suitably combined. The preparation was, in fact, made with the aid of large international organisations, like the International Chamber of Commerce which took a very positive and active part in the whole of the work, large industrial organisations throughout the world and of many individual experts from various countries. The consequence was that when the Conference ultimately met it not only had at its disposal a series of studies and a set of documents perhaps without precedent in the history of economic conferences, but, through this collaboration in the process of preparation, it elicited and evoked the active sympathy and support of many thousands of those whose influence was required to create the proper atmosphere.

With that preparation behind it the Council of the League summoned the Conference, which consisted of about two hundred members appointed by fifty Governments. The members were not appointed as official spokesmen, but as having a very wide range of expert qualification. There were bankers, industrialists, merchants, economists, officials with experience of commercial treaty-making, agriculturists, and representatives of workers and of consumers' organisations. There were not only people from every quarter of the globe, but with every kind of expert

qualification and representing every shade of responsible opinion. It was feared, and with some reason, that a body so widely representative and so responsible would probably not arrive at a unanimous recommendation on matters so controversial and so difficult as those within the economic sphere.

Happily the fears were not realised, and it was found possible to discover in that very diverse assembly a common ground of agreed policy much wider in extent and much more drastic in character than had been hoped. What was the nature of the policy recommended? The Conference was initiated on a French proposal and, on the whole, the idea of M. Loucheur, who proposed it, was, he thought, that it should be chiefly an industrial Conference. The Conference proved to be not an industrial Conference but a commercial one, which was more in accordance with the British idea. There were some interesting and useful resolutions on industry and agriculture, but they were relatively of little importance compared with the resolutions on commerce. The central theme of the Conference related to commercial policy and to tariffs.

He would pass over the minor recommendations with regard to tasks already in hand, such as removing prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports, a task which he hoped was being brought to a successful conclusion in the form of an international convention by the special conference now meeting at Geneva. The Economic Conference found that in the world as a whole trade barriers, and in particular tariffs, were higher than before the War, and too high, were more complicated than before the War, and too complicated, were more frequently changed and too frequently changed. And, in a word, the main recommendation was that tariffs should be reduced, simplified and stabilised. It would be seen that this was not a policy of free trade. A Conference so composed could never have agreed on such rival issues as free trade and protection. The policy was one not of free but of freer trade. People of every shade of responsible opinion, and from practically every country in the world, meeting at Geneva agreed that it was of the utmost importance in the interest of the progress and prosperity of the world that a policy of freer trade than at present should be pursued.

With regard to methods, first of all the Conference recommended that countries should reduce their tariffs by separate action and should not wait for other countries; secondly, that

they should proceed by means of bi-lateral agreements and commercial treaties; thirdly, that the present system of bargaining tariffs or *tarifs de combat* should be discontinued; and, fourthly, that the League organisation should consider from time to time what other methods could be usefully employed to induce countries to give effect to the recommendations. Incidentally, the Conference did not suggest that the method of procedure should be by way of calling a general tariff conference for the purpose of arriving at a general convention for the reduction of tariffs.

It was not at all difficult to understand why new trade barriers began to grow up in the years immediately succeeding the War, for the four years of war conditions and blockades compelled countries which had previously imported articles from abroad to make those articles at home. The blockades had constituted a sort of high protectionists' paradise, and home industries were never so effectively protected as they were by the submarine. When the blockades ended the effect was the same as it would have been in a high protectionist country that suddenly abolished the whole of its tariffs. No free trader, however extreme, would advocate a measure involving such unemployment, such dislocation, such general loss, as an act like that would involve. It was, therefore, natural that the countries should proceed to mitigate what would otherwise have been the dislocation caused by suddenly throwing open to world competition industries that had grown up under the shelter of blockades, and should protect them by means of new trade barriers of one sort or another. Further, when the War finished, many countries were short of their most immediate necessities in the way of food and raw materials, and it was natural that they should impose one form or another of restriction on the export of such stores as they might have in their own territories. Then, as currency fluctuations became serious they caused new restrictions for opposite reasons. Countries whose currency went rapidly and completely to pieces found that they were being sold out as the result of depreciation, and naturally they took steps to prevent it. Conversely, countries whose currency remained relatively stable found that they were suffering from dumping exchange and took similar measures. There were other reasons arising out of the War and war conditions which made it natural, intelligible, and for a time even right that new tariffs and new trade barriers should be imposed. But however intelligible and however right at first, the continuance of such tariffs long after the causes for which

they were originally imposed had disappeared resulted in the greatest possible damage and loss.

In spite of all that remained to be done, considerable progress had been made in the last few years. Soon after the War complete schemes and systems of prohibition, with occasional exceptions through licence, were found in many European countries. Later, there was general freedom subject to occasional prohibition. Then there was a system of contingents under which the import of definite quotas of articles was allowed. Lastly, there was an increasing tendency to restrict the measure of protection which remained to the era of the tariffs themselves. That process was not quite complete, and the Conference now sitting at Geneva was trying to complete it.

He would refer to the different evils one by one. The increase in tariffs had been almost entirely confined to manufactured articles—not raw materials or semi-manufactured articles or food-stuffs. On the whole, although the increase had varied considerably in different countries, it had tended on the average to be something like thirty per cent. in real weight. Incidentally, he might remark that there was a rather interesting apparent relation between the economic isolation which was represented in very high trade barriers and political isolation. It was difficult to measure the weight of a tariff, and the results of measurement were open to debate. He had, however, asked his Section in Geneva a few weeks ago what were the highest trade barriers in the world, and had been interested to receive in reply the opinion that the four highest were (he could not vouch for the order within the four) the United States, Russia, Brazil and Spain—that was to say, the two great countries not in the League and the two countries which had given notice of withdrawal from the League.

The complexity of tariffs took very many forms. First of all the League Convention of 1923 had done something to reduce the delays and complications of the mere formalities of customs. The process was not complete, but progress had been made. At one time the mere formalities of customs were often more serious than the actual weight of the tariff itself. Five years ago he was asked to go to a big international conference and explain what the League was doing in the direction of trying to simplify customs formalities, but his papers, giving the data on which his address was to have been based, were detained by the operation of those formalities, and he was, therefore, unable to give the address! This contretemps was much more eloquent

and effective than any speech he could have delivered on the subject. Customs units in Europe had since the War been increased from twenty to twenty-seven, and the length of frontier lines in Europe had grown by seven thousand miles or so. The actual tariff classification was enormously complicated. There was the *ad valorem* system under which one paid on the value of the goods. That resulted in extremely inquisitorial methods of ascertaining the value. Alternatively there was the system of specific duties. This meant a very highly detailed nomenclature and classification. Classification and nomenclature had been devised separately by each country without relation to the classification and nomenclature adopted in other countries, and the consequent confusion was a very considerable extra impediment to trade. Two Committees had been working at Geneva, and so far with considerable success, on this intricate subject, but it must take years to achieve any very substantial results. Quite apart from the confusion and waste, there were all sorts of other inconvenient results. For example, classification might be used to defeat the most-favoured-nation clause, which had been for so long the sheet-anchor of British economic policy and was still, he thought, the hope of reaching a decent tariff position in the future. He need not remind his hearers that the most-favoured-nation clause meant that where two countries arranged to reduce a particular article, other countries coming under that clause automatically secured the advantage of the reduction. But if the two countries negotiating so defined the article in respect to which the reduction was made that the arrangement could not possibly apply to the goods of any other country, the whole purpose of the most-favoured-nation clause was defeated.

With regard to the instability of post-War tariffs it was sufficient to say that whereas it was customary for pre-War tariff treaties to be made for ten or twelve years, an examination of a hundred and eighty post-War agreements showed that no less than one hundred and fifty-three, or all but twenty-seven of them, were subject to change within the year. A tariff, even a high one, became in time like a natural impediment, an extra sea or mountain, to which industry and trade could adjust themselves; but a system of changing tariffs, under which a manufacturer never knew at the time of making an article the height of the barrier it would have to surmount before it reached the consumer, was a condition of affairs to which trade and

industry could not adjust themselves and was utterly disruptive of international trade.

The Economic Conference also strongly condemned the method of negotiating by bargaining tariffs—the *tarifs de combat*—in regard to which, again, a very serious difference existed in the pre-War and the post-War practice. Before the War a country normally gave notice of its intention to change its tariffs, negotiated a new commercial treaty and then finally introduced the new tariff as modified by the agreements made in the course of the negotiations. Since the War a custom had grown up of saying, “We are going to have a new tariff; before starting negotiations let us impose a very high tariff so that we may be in a good position for the negotiations.” That meant two changes instead of one. It meant at the best having for a long period a higher tariff than the economic advisers of the country imposing it thought to be best in the interests of that country; and, as with competitive armaments so with competitive tariffs, it meant in the end a much higher level of tariffs on both sides and on all sides. So much for what the Conference was and what it recommended.

What were the prospects of practical results? Even in the case of the Brussels Financial Conference, which had a much more limited sphere and which dealt with evils which were not deep-rooted as were those dealt with by the Economic Conference, it was years before it was possible to see results. Apart from that consideration, every trade barrier and increased tariff, for whatever reason it was originally introduced, had created a vested interest which was now a buttress and support for it. Whether or not those reasons were going to make it impracticable for hopes and desires to be realised, it must at least be realised that immediate and drastic results were not to be expected. Yet within a few weeks of the conclusion of the Conference a very popular journal in this country actually had a leader entitled “Watch this Lower Tariff Bluff,” in which it said, in effect—six weeks ago the Economic Conference recommended that Europe should reduce its tariffs; we have waited six weeks and it has not done so; it is time that we increased ours. It was of no use to expect results in six weeks or even six months.

Turning to favourable considerations which made one hope that results might and would be reached, the Conference had brought out with great force and clearness the fact that the

causes which accounted for the introduction of increased trade barriers and increased tariffs were temporary and that many of them had disappeared, while others were disappearing. That, of course, was not decisive because, as he had said, whatever its origin a trade barrier once erected created a vested interest; but at least it should be easier than it otherwise would have been to get rid of a tariff introduced for a cause no longer in existence. It was, secondly, clear when the Conference met that the time had been well chosen, that people in many parts of the world had begun to feel that matters had gone too far and that what looked like individual wisdom was really collective insanity. The Conference, therefore, did not initiate but reinforced a movement which was already developing, and crystallised and made articulate a feeling already existing. That resulted, of course, in a much greater hope for the future than any new movement suddenly improvised could possibly have resulted in. A most important feature was that thousands of people and many of the most powerful organisations in the world, above all the International Chamber of Commerce, of which the Chairman was President last year, collaborated to give effect to its results. If any body of men could have been conscious of difficulties in the way of realising the hopes of the Conference it was the members themselves, but it was impossible to read their Report and to remark its form and phrasing without gaining the impression that what was expressed as their unanimous desire was almost their confident hope.

There had, further, been a considerable number of declarations of opinion with regard to the Report of the Conference. First of all, the Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce met, by a happy coincidence, at Stockholm in the month after the World Economic Conference, and not only endorsed the recommendations of the Conference very strongly, but in effect placed the powerful organisation it had at command at the service of the movement. At about the same time the Council of the League of Nations gave an opportunity for declarations from a considerable number of Governments either then or in September. There had been declarations from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Austria, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and this country accepting the recommendations of the Conference. The countries first named made declarations of particular force and completeness, but all accepted at least the principles.

An even more acid test was the effect of the resolutions in actual practice. That was a much more difficult question. He thought that even in the short period of five months some instances of the influence of the Conference could be seen. Both France and Germany, for example, had publicly declared that the recent Franco-German Commercial Treaty could not have been concluded apart from the help and influence of the Conference. Austrians who had followed the negotiations very carefully had told him that, apart from the influence of the Conference, the recent Czechoslovak-Austrian Treaty could probably not have been concluded, or concluded in so favourable a form as it had been. He thought that among the influences which made it impossible for the French Government to put through the very extreme and complicated new tariff that it produced about the time of the Conference and which made it unlikely, perhaps, that the proposal would go through in anything like its original form, were the influences reflected and expressed at Geneva in May. He considered, too, that the movement which found force at Geneva was not without effect on the history of the coal embargo. The protests against the coal embargo suddenly flared up and as suddenly faded away. One coal exporter after another, when asked whether he would join in the protests, said that he could not because he was not hurt and was getting all the licences he wanted. In fact, the coal embargo was largely killed by licences almost as soon as it was imposed. It was very difficult, if not impossible, to estimate how far the forces that came from Geneva and Stockholm had contributed to the result; but he thought that undoubtedly they had had a substantial influence.

Regarding the methods by which the movement might be encouraged and pushed further, although the League could do something it could not do the main work. It could work at technical tasks like tariff nomenclature and classification and perhaps could take advantage of the appropriate moment to get the Governments of the world together with a view to further progress; but the main work must be national and would fall upon those in each country who could influence their own Governments. The League might garner as it had sown, but all the intermediate processes were really much more national than international in character.

Other methods had been proposed outside the League by which results might be reached. It had sometimes been suggested that the development of international cartels would have the effect of

securing reduction of tariffs. That question was examined at Geneva with the result that it was thought that there was very little hope along that avenue. Another proposal of interest was that the movement might be supported by group meetings between the people in particular trades in one country and another. That was a method in which Sir Alan Anderson had particular faith. He himself had not quite so much faith in it, although it might in certain cases be extremely useful. He hoped that the Chairman would put his views upon the subject before the meeting. The movement could, he thought, only be effective and successful if those interests and those bodies of the public which really stood in every country to gain by it could be somehow mobilised and made effective. The whole trouble in getting together the necessary force for any movement towards freer trade was that, almost by definition, those who stood to gain were less organised and less concentrated than those who stood to lose; that was to say, if a tariff was removed it was perfectly obvious that the industry protected by it would lose; but the people who would gain were diffused and scattered and their collective views were more difficult to ascertain. The consumers in every country stood to gain by lower prices. All the industries which were not protected and did not hope for protection—for example, agriculture in an industrially protected country—stood to gain, as did the great export trades. If the movement was to be successful the public electorally, and the industries and export trades through their organisations, must bring to bear upon their different countries the weight of their interest and authority. They must press their countries to reduce their own tariffs and to use the reduction in negotiating reductions in the tariffs of other countries. The operation of the most-favoured-nation clause must at the same time be developed for the benefit of other countries. It was to be hoped that there would be international and national meetings waiting and watching and taking advantage of reduction anywhere to try to spread the knowledge and the influence of it; that was the way in which in the main he could see the movement going forward.

In conclusion, he would say a few words (he hoped not indiscreetly) as to the possible English contribution to the process. England had quite definitely expressed its approval and acceptance of the principles of the Economic Conference Report. Although it was true that there were very few protective duties in this country, they were duties which had been recently introduced

and had necessitated trade adjustments in other countries, and were, therefore, very actively in the minds of those other countries. Could not England say that, recognising the importance of the movement taking shape, at least it would not embarrass it by any new increases for a considerable period but would wait and see whether or not it was a success? Could we not even indicate that in the event of the success of the movement we would retrace our steps? Obviously there were difficulties in the way of any such pronouncement, obviously it was difficult to retrace steps; but if the movement meant anything in Europe it meant a very considerable retracing of steps by other countries, and if it was immensely to the advantage of England that steps should be retraced, was it not really worth while to take some sort of risk and make some sort of contribution which was not inconsistent with the declared policy of any political party in the country or any Government although it might be in conflict with some sections of public opinion?

He would have liked in making these suggestions to develop the advantages of such a policy, not only from the point of view of the prosperity of the world, but from the point of view of the peace of the world; but he would only remind the meeting of the very special interest of this country in helping forward the movement. If the question was asked, "What is wrong in this country?" the answer was perfectly clear. There were a million unemployed, concentrated, as to the bulk of them, in a few great export trades—coal, cotton, wool, engineering, and shipbuilding. The most striking feature of the trade figures of the country was their obvious correspondence with the first fact he had mentioned, namely, that as compared with before the War the country had lost about one-fifth of the pre-War volume of its exports. That was what was wrong. If to the advantage which might be hoped for from a lowering of the tariffs of the world were added the advantages which the whole of the world might hope to get by the adoption of a policy which so much increased the chances of the maintenance of the peace of the world, and if, taking only the economic advantages for this country, the advantages to which he had referred were translated into human terms—terms of reduced unemployment and an increased standard of living—it would, he thought, be realised that anything that this country could do to help forward the movement, even by somewhat modifying the policy which might otherwise be adopted, would be well worth while.

MR. W. T. LAYTON thought that it was only fair to say that the statement that this country had placed protective duties on only two or three per cent. of its imports was not only true of the present but was equally true in regard to the period before the imposition of the Safeguarding Duties. The Safeguarding Duties touched only a relatively unimportant part of the imports, and the case made at Geneva that this country was to all intents and purposes a vast open market was still true. How long it would continue so remained to be seen. The argument built upon that was valid from the international point of view. It was to the interest of the rest of the world that this market should remain open, because this country bought one-fifth of all the exports of the world—a colossal figure—and this country could not go on buying unless it could also sell.

It had been suggested that the Conference, so far as tariffs were concerned, was, so to speak, a victory for the British thesis as against the French thesis. It was a pity to emphasise that point of view. It was perfectly true that the general commercial recommendations of the Conference were in line with traditional British policy; but it was not true that the British Delegation altered the current of opinion in the Conference to any appreciable extent. The commercial recommendations of the Conference represented a change of opinion in the world generally. It was very difficult to say what would have happened if the Conference had had a different *personnel*; but the fact remained that its commercial recommendations definitely represented a new point of view. There was some difficulty in bringing in certain countries that were definitely protectionist in outlook. Those countries had carefully to consider the way in which the Report was framed before they could support it. One of the Dominions found it an awkward problem. The Australian members had to scrutinise very closely the first draft of the Commercial Report; but after a little discussion their difficulties were overcome. But their adhesion was not unjustified. *The Times* of last week printed extracts from a Report of the Australian Tariff Board, which was a body of protectionists set up to administer and organise the tariff. The Board told the people of Australia that the tariff in Australia had run to excess and that there was danger of its doing the greatest possible damage to the economic life of Australia. The Report pointed out that as soon as a duty on imports had been put up the Wages Board had to consider a demand for higher wages. As soon as that was granted the industry concerned asked for a higher tariff. It pointed out that as a matter of fact costs had risen so much as the result of the battle-dore and shuttlecock arrangement in Australia that the system had proved ineffective and had become a very serious menace. The Board appealed to Parliament to consider the question as a non-party matter from the point of view of the future of Australia.

Again, he had just observed in a Report of the British Commercial Counsellor in Washington a statement to the effect that in America

a feeling was growing not only in commercial but in some industrial circles that the tariff introduced in abnormal circumstances immediately after the War was not now suitable to the needs of the country. The writer quoted the fact that the motor industry desired to see the countervailing duties at present in existence on motor-cars imported into the United States removed, and pointed out that other industries were in a similar position. It was thought by the American members of the Economic Conference, who represented both political parties in the United States, that in the coming years the country would move not necessarily to complete free trade but certainly in the direction of freer trade.

The Report of the Economic Conference truly represented a changing opinion in the world. It was certainly not the case that the French accepted the conclusions merely under pressure of general opinion. The second French Delegate was in many respects a very liberal-minded man who had striven for years to resist any tendency towards an extreme commercial policy in his country. One could imagine what would have happened had French commercial policy been as imperialistic as French political policy during recent years. It was only fair to recognise that it had been relatively liberal since the end of the War. The League of Nations in assessing tariffs of different countries had shown that France was one of the countries the *ad valorem* incidence of whose tariff was still lower than before the War—the new French tariff not yet having come into existence. The French point of view was, “We are for a liberal commercial policy; but if this constant increase is going on all around us we cannot afford to be out of it,” and therefore they proposed to introduce a bargaining tariff. They had always been great tariff bargainers. They wanted a very large margin between the maximum and the minimum tariff. It was the French who were responsible for the first draft on commercial policy that came before the Conference. It included a proposition that tariffs should be limited to countervailing duties. That was not a limitation at all, because the doctrine of the countervailing duty could be used to defend any tariff. Therefore the Conference turned and rended it. The French member of the Commerce Commission then proposed what would probably prove to be one of the most important recommendations of the Economic Conference—that the Economic Committee of the League or the Economic Organisation of the League should be asked to try to organise a co-operative and conjoint reduction of tariffs.

It was very important that people here should be patient and should realise that there was a genuine movement in Europe and elsewhere. Sir Arthur had mentioned that a popular journal wanted results in six weeks; but rapid results were expected in other quarters. The Yorkshire woollen manufacturers were of opinion that they ought to get on with their own “safeguarding” proposals if nothing was done by the time the Assembly met. He believed that the Dutch

also were meditating the imposition of a double tariff for bargaining purposes. If anything happened at Geneva such tendencies would be stopped, but if nothing happened there the wrong kind of movement might begin again. It was absurd to expect results in six weeks or even six months, but it was very important not to delay too long. He rejoiced to see the steps which were taken by the Council of the League to deal with this matter, and heartily agreed with Sir Arthur Salter that this country ought to be in the vanguard of the movement.

MAJOR LEIGH AMAN suggested that Sir Arthur Salter had laid too much emphasis on tariffs, which, after all, were only a temporary barrier to the exchange of products, and production—the task of industry in this country—was of far more importance in the end than mere commerce.

The one failure of the Brussels Conference was the ter Meulen proposal for all international monetary arrangements. Similarly, he believed that in the near future the tariff question would occupy a position of comparatively little importance and that the Economic Conference itself would live by reason of the publicity it had given to the questions of rationalisation and the reconstruction of industry as a whole, and because of the resolutions it had passed in connection with the agricultural industry. Sir Arthur Salter had not touched upon these resolutions, but they showed the importance of maintaining an adequate balance between agriculture and industry—a thing forgotten in this country—and emphasised the stabilisation of agricultural prices as one of the methods by which agriculture could re-establish itself in the world.

SIR JOHN POWER wished to thank Sir Arthur Salter for the extremely clear way in which he had expounded the matter. He thought that everybody in the country, whether tariff reformer or free trader, ought to agree with what he had said. There was general agreement that the country was suffering from the partial closing down of its exports and from the barriers erected against its trade in every quarter of the globe. The question of how to get the barriers removed ought to be considered. He rather differed from Sir Arthur's conclusions on that point. England as a free-trade nation had given the world a lead, but as far as he was aware the world had not followed it. How was it that the world now began to see that tariffs were doing immense harm? He wondered whether it was because this country had been giving them a little of their own medicine. He could not agree that the country should revert to its old policy. It had to be realised that if the people could not be provided with work they must be given doles. So far as he could see the Safeguarding Duties had not put up prices but had provided work for a great many people.

MR. WALEY COHEN asked whether the statement had been made,

when the reduction of tariffs was discussed at the Conference, that the most-favoured-nation principle had hampered the conclusion of a mutual arrangement for reducing tariffs, and whether there was any substance in this contention.

MR. REID said that he had been interested in what Mr. Layton had said about America. There were fourteen million industrial workers in that country and seven million in this. The output in America of those fourteen million workers was valued at twelve thousand million pounds, while the value of the output of the seven million workpeople in this country was three thousand million pounds—a tremendous difference. It would be helpful to learn how that difference could be got rid of. As far as exports were concerned, the American output was represented by eight per cent. of the total produced, while our own foreign trade was represented by twenty-five per cent. The American people had hardly touched the foreign market.

SIR WILLIAM GOODE explained that he had been the toad under the harrow at too many conferences to have very much love for them. The practical work done by the last Conference at Geneva had not only assisted Central Europe to visualise their difficulties by formulating them, but had greatly assisted towards an eventual though very slow solution of the minor economic difficulties of Europe.

LT.-COMMANDER E. S. WILLIAMS asked whether the organisation of individual Chambers of Commerce all over Europe, acting, as they do, as a go-between for merchants and manufacturers on the one side and Governments on the other, was not adequate to further the recommendations of The Economic Conference. It would seem from the Report of the Conference that agriculture in general was in no need of regeneration. Agriculture was the occupation of the majority of the workers of the world, and its products represented the greater part of the value of human labour.

MR. WYNDHAM BEWES asked whether the Economic Conference had arrived at any conclusion upon the question of Through Bills of Lading (actually part of the Bounty system).

MR. H. WILSON HARRIS asked how far tariffs were discussed by the Conference in their political aspect. Obviously one of the great difficulties confronting Europe to-day was the modification of political frontiers. Most of them hoped that the evils of bad political frontiers might be palliated by arrangements which on the political side would provide for the better treatment of minorities and on the economic side would prevent political frontiers from becoming economic barriers.

Was the political question discussed on its two sides? Were the obvious political advantages of lower barriers discussed, and, even more important, was there any latent suggestion made that it might be desirable to perpetuate and emphasise economic barriers in order to use them as an argument for the revision of political frontiers?

SIR ALAN ANDERSON, *the Chairman*, said that commercial and industrial folk in Europe and the United States of America were perfectly agreed as to the differences between the two. The United States was a very large area with a very large population of consumers between whom there were no barriers of speech, finance or tariff. In Europe, on the other hand, internal barriers obstructed the movement of men and goods, retarded trade, and damaged the civilisation and the well-being of mankind. He would not say that America was better off than it should be, but that Europe was not well enough off.

The question of the possibilities of practical results from the Economic Conference was very important. His own feeling was that unless there were practical results the people of Europe would sink down in the scale of civilisation. Countries could not maintain their present standard if they built up barriers against one another and endeavoured in each little section of the world's surface to produce all the goods that were wanted. They had to trade together. Unfortunately when men talked about pulling down "barriers" they really meant pulling down the other man's barrier. That was the difficulty. Before tariffs could be lowered the manufacturers must ask their own Governments to undo what they had formerly asked them to do—to help their trade by lowering the very tariffs which had previously been imposed to help their trade. Someone had said this was the job of the International Chamber of Commerce, but it was a national task. A previous speaker had spoken as if shipowners had some personal interest in Free Trade because, under Protection, trade would only move in one direction. It did not matter to him as a shipowner whether his ships went empty or full, as long as he was paid, but the people who consumed the goods would find the bill heavy if one cargo had to pay for two voyages. The shipowners and merchants and bankers of the world, at meetings held long before the Geneva Conference, had decided that Flag Discrimination, which is protection as applied to shipping, was intolerable and had always led to bickerings and grave disturbance and sometimes to war. So a convention was unanimously adopted at Geneva four years ago to stop Flag Discrimination. He would like groups of trades to consult together whether they could not provide similar practical support for the Geneva Resolutions. If the trades and industries of England made up their minds that they really wanted lower tariffs and less barriers, and really wanted to apply the Resolutions of the Economic Conference they should go to the President of the Board of Trade and say so.

SIR ARTHUR SALTER entirely accepted what Mr. Layton had said with regard to the protective duties in England being limited to two or three per cent. of the imports.

It would be most misleading, and indeed injurious, to suggest that the policy recommended by the Conference was distinctively British and not a continental or world policy. He certainly did not mean to say that it was a British policy as distinct from a continental or French one.

He had been reproached by a speaker for concentrating too exclusively on commerce and neglecting industry and agriculture. He purported only to represent what the Economic Conference had done and recommended. It was true that the Report purported to launch a big movement in the sphere of commercial policy and did not purport to launch a comparable movement in the sphere of industry or agriculture, but it made certain suggestions in regard to agriculture and industry which might have useful results.

Sir John Power had said that he was extremely anxious to see tariffs reduced, but had proceeded to speak in a way which suggested that he was not quite so anxious as he had seemed to be. The specific question before the meeting was how to get lower tariffs in Europe. Was the answer to the question, "What can this country do?" "Increase safeguarding?" If safeguarding was increased would it help forward the movement or retard it? Personally he should deprecate anything like a definite statement or threat that if the movement did not prove a success we should increase safeguarding. But it was well that the world should realise that there were forces in this country which might result in increased safeguarding if the movement was not a success.

In reply to Mr. Waley Cohen's question, he would say that there were instances in which the most-favoured-nation principle had acted in the way indicated. The negotiations between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the question of a movement confined to those countries for reducing tariffs among themselves undoubtedly came up against the difficulty of the most-favoured-nation treatment. There were cases, undoubtedly, in which the most-favoured-nation clause prevented agreements which otherwise might be useful. The advantages and the disadvantages had to be balanced.

Commander Williams had asked whether the organisation of the International Chamber of Commerce was not adequate and sufficient. That organisation was going to be one of the most powerful instruments for securing the success of the movement, but no organisation or set of organisations that could be conceived could be more than adequate, and no single organisation was adequate for securing that.

He thought that the question of through bills of lading was not discussed; but the Conference gave general encouragement to the work of the Transit Organisation of the League in that connection.

With regard to the proposal by the Chairman, he thought that

progress might be achieved along the lines of negotiations by trade groups, but was not sure that as much could be achieved as the Chairman hoped.

Mr. Wilson Harris had raised a very important aspect of the whole of the problem, namely, as to whether political aspects were discussed in detail at the Conference. He thought that the answer was, No. When debating the economic resolutions the political aspects and considerations were certainly not discussed in any detail, but the whole Conference realised, and was happy to realise, he thought, that in making their recommendations primarily with a view to their economic effect they were certainly making recommendations the political advantages of which would be added to and would reinforce the economic advantages.

THE WORK OF THE EIGHTH ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

*(Record of an address by the Right Hon. Sir Hilton Young, G.B.E.,
D.S.O., D.S.C., M.P., on October 13th, 1927, and the
discussion following.)*

SIR EDWARD HILTON YOUNG said that the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations, like every other Assembly, had its special characteristics. It met in a state of considerable disappointment and agitation. The disappointment was due to the recent history of the cause with which the League was principally associated, the cause of the promotion of peace through disarmament. The disappointment centred round the comparative failure (one must not admit the failure to be more than comparative) of the preliminary proceedings to the Disarmament Conference and, secondly, the apparently complete failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference. Then there were certain personal incidents also which added to the atmosphere of agitation in which the Assembly met.

It would be impossible to give any impression of what was achieved at the Eighth Assembly without making an effort to place the proceedings in historical perspective by relating them to preceding history. The principal activity of the League was to promote the cause of peace and to pursue that cause through disarmament. The most striking characteristic of the history of the movement for peace and disarmament on the part of the League of Nations had been the evolution of the methods of securing peace in two channels; in the first place, direct disarmament and, in the second place, security as a preliminary to disarmament.

He would briefly trace the history of disarmament in relation to security. He desired to emphasise that there were two aspects of security. The first aspect was that of security by means of a general agreement which would cover all parts of the civilised world. The second was that of security by regional agreements which would cover only a particular area. It would be impossible to understand what happened at the Eighth Assembly unless one went rapidly through the history of the movement for security by means of either total or regional agreements.

The origin of the movement was in Article VIII of the Covenant. That Article contained the words, "taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State." At the very outset of the history of the League as an engine for promoting peace, those words emphasised the necessity for security. That was implied in the reference to the "circumstances of each State." Regional agreements were implied in the words, "the geographical situation."

In 1922 for the first time the two rival methods for promoting disarmament were defined by the work done by the Temporary Mixed Commission. One could detect the origin of the two methods in the schemes proposed by that Commission. The first was the Esher scheme. The characteristic of that scheme was a recommendation for the reduction of all armaments by a general agreement forthwith without troubling about obtaining in the first place greater security for States. That might be called the frontal attack upon disarmament—disarmament forthwith by mutual agreement binding all in a cast-iron manner without troubling about facilitating disarmament by security.

Alternative to that, and indeed conflicting with that, was the method which was proposed in that same year in a scheme put forward by Lord Cecil, by which disarmament was to be founded upon security, and security obtained by a general defensive agreement to guarantee the security of all States. The essence of that scheme, if he understood it correctly, and he spoke subject to correction by its authors, was that better security must precede any general measure of disarmament. Also, if he judged correctly, he detected in that scheme the dawn of the regional principle, the principle which looked to the possibility that a general defensive agreement could best be built upon a series of regional agreements. He detected the dawn of the regional idea in that scheme because it was recognised that the obligation to help the "aggrieved" nation was limited to that part of the world in which the assisting State could be expected reasonably to operate. There was thus in 1922 for the first time the distinction drawn between the two methods of procedure for disarmament. The first was by direct agreement without waiting for security, and the second was by first attaining a greater measure of security.

In 1922 the Assembly quite definitely and conclusively decided in favour of the second alternative. It rejected the idea of proceeding forthwith to a general measure of disarmament without basing it upon greater security, and adopted the principle that greater security must be obtained for States before they

could be expected generally to disarm. He found that decision of the Assembly in the famous Resolution No. XIV, in which it was said that the disarming State must receive in exchange for its agreement to disarm a satisfactory guarantee of safety by a defensive agreement between the States that were parties to the disarmament plan. That Resolution accepted the principle of security first as a precedent to disarmament, but it did not, if he understood it, accept the principle of building on regional agreements. On the contrary, it insisted that the scheme of defensive agreements must be a general scheme covering all members of the League. The regional idea, though not expressly, was at any rate implicitly, rejected.

The Assembly was thus started upon the quest for security to serve as a foundation for disarmament, and the history of the succeeding years was the history of the following out of that quest. That was the origin of the next two incidents in the history of the labours of the Assembly. First of all there was the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1923, an effort to obtain the all-embracing defensive agreement as a basis for security. That, for reasons which were familiar, did not succeed. In the second place there was the Protocol of 1924, a second effort to obtain an all-embracing agreement for security as a foundation for disarmament. That, again, did not succeed, for reasons which were well known.

In 1925, when it was ascertained that the Protocol would not succeed, when the Assembly met it had before it still unperformed its major task of promoting peace through disarmament. It had decided that it must first of all obtain a general measure of security through an all-embracing agreement, and it had failed to obtain any such measure. The movement for security had thus been checked, and it was necessary for the Assembly to decide what to do next. It came to the conclusion that the great work must not be allowed to come to an end, and that in spite of the failure to obtain a measure of security it must proceed directly with the work of disarmament, that if security could not be obtained as a preliminary it must proceed with disarmament directly, reverting rather to the original Esher idea. It resolved accordingly that the studies necessary as a preparation for the task of disarmament should be proceeded with on the technical side pending any further efforts to increase the security of the States concerned by agreement. The Preparatory Committee was founded, and the League thus turned itself to the

task of cautiously approaching disarmament directly and without waiting for security.

Then came Locarno. That altered all the factors in the problem. It provided an instance of a successful agreement in which security was promoted by an understanding which was regional and not universal, which did not cover all the Member States. When the Assembly met in 1926 it met under the influence of that new fact, that one regional agreement at any rate had been achieved, and of that other new fact, that as a result Germany had become a member of the League. At the critical Assembly of 1926 the situation was that, encouraged by seeing a greater degree of practical security based upon the Locarno Treaties, the Assembly definitely cast aside, not expressly but implicitly, the idea of waiting for further security for Member States before proceeding with the task of disarmament, and decided that on the more secure basis achieved by the Locarno Treaties it would proceed forthwith with the work of negotiating directly. It completed the change in its general attitude from that in the earlier period at which it had decided that disarmament must wait for security. So an effort was made then to start off with direct negotiations for disarmament. The Resolution of the Assembly of that year called for a Conference on Disarmament "corresponding to the existing condition of regional and general security." That was accepting the position that had been produced by the Locarno Treaties and not making it a condition precedent that there should be further effort for security by agreement before embarking on direct negotiations for disarmament.

There followed the labours of the Preparatory Committee in 1927, and subsidiary to those the labours of the Three-Power Conference. Those bodies worked upon the idea of direct negotiations for disarmament without waiting further to promote the security of the Member States. The work failed.

The Assembly met last September under the conditions indicated. It had tried security as a preliminary to disarmament and it had not achieved anything. It had failed with the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol. But a step forward had been taken in the achievement of the regional agreement of Locarno. It had then made a direct effort for disarmament without waiting for security, and that had failed too. The pendulum had swung about. One must interpret the proceedings of the Assembly this year as the next natural swing of the

pendulum. The Assembly came to the conclusion that in order to further the cause of peace through disarmament it must once more revive the question of security and once more make an effort to obtain security as a foundation upon which to build disarmament. On the first occasion on which the Assembly considered security as a necessary basis of disarmament it dismissed the regional idea, but on the second occasion, encouraged by the success of the Locarno Treaties and seeing the solid foundation stone which they had laid, it emphasised the possibility of regional agreements as a basis for progress.

To come to the actual work of the Assembly this year, there were three principal Resolutions round which the work of the Assembly centred. He would take them in the order of importance.

There was first of all the Polish Resolution, which came as a surprise. It might be described as a backwater of the main current. It served to ventilate opinion, but it achieved no very great result. It was mooted in the first place as a Resolution which imposed upon those who agreed to it a general abjuration of all war under all circumstances. It suggested very formidable difficulties to those who stood for the absolute maintenance of every letter in the Covenant. There could be no doubt that the proposal contained in the original suggestion thrown out by the Polish representative exceeded anything contained in Article XV of the Covenant. In the second place, the original suggestions would have imposed very formidable difficulties upon the signatories of the Locarno Treaties, who are bound under certain circumstances to come with all their forces to the support of those Treaties even independently of any Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations. Therefore, in the original form in which the Polish Resolution was proposed, it was unacceptable to many Member States. But in the course of those preliminary proceedings which take place in the League of Nations and which are not, as some thought, confined to the Powers called "Great," the Resolution was substantially modified, and when it came before the Assembly it was in a form which certainly could be accepted. Whether in that form it achieved much might be doubted. The essential words of the Resolution were: "Considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression would tend to create an atmosphere of general confidence." He laid stress upon those words because they showed how the minds of all those who were struggling, and honestly struggling, with the problem during the Assembly were turned towards the necessity

for the creation of security as a preliminary to disarmament. The Resolution then proceeded to its substantive part, which began: "That all wars of aggression are and shall always be prohibited." Of course, the whole point was in the word "aggression." Hitherto the accurate defining of "aggression" had baffled everybody. However, in that form undoubtedly the Resolution was acceptable, and it was accepted. He personally did not think that it added anything whatever to the Covenant, and he confessed that he thought that most of those who were present upon the occasion, which was intended to be one of solemnity, when the Delegations one by one, upon a roll-call vote, got up and announced their adhesion to it, were conscious of a certain comedy, or at any rate of a certain lack of complete impressiveness, in the occasion, because after all the Resolution added nothing whatever to what already existed in the Covenant. It was an effort to find the path of security, but it was an effort that came to nothing.

He came now to the second of the principal Resolutions this year. It was that proposed by the Delegation of Holland. That, again, was an effort to find the path of security as a preliminary to further work for disarmament. As introduced, it contained certain phrases which were worth calling attention to, because if one followed them and followed the reason why they were not accepted one would understand a great deal about the proceedings this year. The Resolution began by saying: "Convinced that, without reopening the discussions on the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it is desirable to consider whether the time has not come to resume the study of the principles on which that Protocol was based." It was quite obvious that the Resolution in that form would reopen the whole question of the Protocol of 1924. It raised the question whether any State which had rejected the Protocol in 1924 and was still bound to reject it could, without gravely misleading its fellow-members of the League, assent to such a form. It was necessary for those who were unable to accept the Protocol of 1924 to point out that a Resolution in that form would be misleading. It was true that one might put a certain interpretation on the phrases in the Resolution and give them a fairly innocent meaning, but on the other hand everybody would understand that as a matter of business anybody who voted for the Resolution in that form was prepared to accept the Protocol of 1924 in substance.

This aspect of the Dutch Resolution led to the next principal incident, namely, the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs. In that speech Sir Austen laid down the policy which was maintained by the British Empire. It was always dangerous to summarise, but he thought that he could summarise the speech by saying that it contained two principles in particular, namely, that the British policy was to stand for the Covenant and the whole Covenant and nothing but the Covenant, and that it was to advocate the promotion of regional agreements of the same type as the Locarno Treaties. Sir Austen pointed out that at the present time the policy of the British Delegation was that it had undertaken grave responsibilities and great risks in the Locarno Treaties, and that it was not prepared and was not able to accept further responsibility and further risks of the like nature which would result in involving the British Empire in war in parts of the world which were more remote. It was now for others to follow our example in those remoter areas.

In view of this speech it was not surprising to find that before the Dutch Resolution was reintroduced it was profoundly modified. The wording became: "Convinced that, without reopening the discussions on the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it is desirable to consider whether the time has not come to resume the study of the principles of disarmament, security and arbitration which are expressed in the Covenant." In other words, it became a Resolution which was not an attempt to disinter the Protocol but which simply re-emphasised the principles of the Covenant.

That Resolution might have been very easily accepted by any Delegation in that form; but as a matter of fact it was not necessary to consider it further, because in the meanwhile there had emerged in the Committee which was concerned with the vital questions of disarmament and security another Resolution which was put forward by the French Delegation, submitted by M. Paul-Boncour, which had the effect of swallowing up the Dutch Resolution. The Netherlands delegates withdrew their Resolution on the ground that it was covered by the French proposal. That proposal formulated what had been contributed by this year's Assembly to the cause of peace and disarmament. It expressed the tendency, which he had emphasised as the tendency of this year's Assembly, to turn away from the effort started in 1924 to effect disarmament by direct frontal attack without waiting for security, and re-insisted upon the necessity of greater measure of security before proceeding with the work of disarmament, adding to that a new element, namely, that the best way in which to advance the cause of security was to give

up the effort for a general and all-embracing agreement for mutual defence or for security on the lines of the Treaty for Mutual Assistance or the Protocol, and to proceed more gradually towards security by the method of regional agreements which had already enjoyed a measure of success in the Treaties of Locarno.

It would shed light upon the inner working of the League if he went more closely into the struggle which took place over the drafting of this Resolution. The purpose of the French Resolution was to start once more the search for security, and the method which it proposed was to charge with the work of examining the possibilities the Preparatory Commission, which was already charged with the work of preparing the ground for Conventions of disarmament. The text as originally proposed was very much modified in the course of the discussion. The modifications were pregnant as regards the future history of the movement and eloquent as regards the possibilities of the League as a machine for promoting the movement.

There were two principal lines of criticism. The first came from the German Delegation. The attitude of the German Delegation was one which it was very important to understand in order to grasp how the League was working at present on the question of disarmament. It was extremely natural. The German point of view, if he understood it, was that disarmament ought to be achieved without any more ado about security. There was a certain naiveté in the way in which some of the German orators at times explained that now that Germany was disarmed the world was safe. That argument was put forward by them with much conviction. Germany must, of course, think that, being disarmed itself, and having made so substantial a contribution as it had made to the cause of security in the Locarno Treaties, it was really asking too much of her to ask her to wait for the promotion of further security before that further measure of disarmament which would put other nations in the same condition as herself. One must recognise that it was quite impossible to expect any German representative at present to take up any other attitude than that. The German attitude was that disarmament could and should proceed without any more ado about security.

He would turn to the text of the Resolution. The second clause of it as originally introduced by M. Paul-Boncour read as follows: "The Third Commission proposes to the Assembly the following Resolution: 'L'Assemblée . . . Préoccupée de réaliser

les conditions politiques indispensables au succès des travaux du désarmement.' ” The Germans, of course, could not accept the word “ indispensables ”—that further security was indispensable to the success of disarmament ; so that was altered so as to read : “ Préoccupée de réaliser les conditions politiques qui assureraient au succès des travaux du désarmement.”

Clause 6 of the Resolution as originally introduced read : “ Recommande la conclusion d'accords d'arbitrage assurant le règlement pacifique de tous les différends en créant, entre tous les pays, la confiance mutuelle indispensable.” The Germans, of course, could never admit the word “ créant ” or the word “ indispensable ” ; they could never admit that further security was necessary to create confidence or that it was indispensable. That difficulty was overcome by substituting the word “ extending ” for the word “ creating.” The clause finally took a form which made it clear that it was not essential but only desirable that there should be more mutual confidence before proceeding with the work of disarmament.

In addition, the Germans required the addition to the Resolution of what was now Clause 7. It quoted and reaffirmed the Resolution which he might perhaps call the “ ginger ” Resolution which was passed last year by the Assembly, recommending the Preparatory Commission to get on with the work as fast as it could. The effect of the German intervention was to emphasise throughout, “ Even if we do not get more security we must assume we got as much as we can at Locarno and we must go ahead with the work of disarmament.”

Now he came to the second principal line of criticism and emendation, which was the British. The British criticism throughout was based upon that attitude which he had already described as being defined by the Secretary of State in his speech to the Assembly—the attitude that we cannot go beyond the Covenant, that we cannot make any engagement which would involve us in warfare further than that which was contained either in the Covenant or in the Treaties of Locarno. To enforce that attitude it was necessary for the Resolution to be amended in certain particulars. One of the clauses of the Resolution originally read : “ soit dans la préparation systématique de l'application des différents articles du Pacte.” The phrase seemed a harmless one, but as a matter of fact the intention was well known. The preparation of the application of the articles of the Pact was in danger of including not preparation only but elaboration, and so that phrase had to be put in the final drafting

into a form which had the effect of making it perfectly clear that the obligations which were undertaken by the signatories of the Resolution, including the British Empire, were obligations which were in no sense larger than those of the Covenant.

Another principal British criticism was in relation to the words: "*l'Assemblée estime que ces mesures peuvent être cherchées, . . . soit dans un assouplissement des dispositions du Protocole.*" The word "*assouplissement*" might convey some meaning to somebody, but he confessed that the precise bearing of the word was extremely dark to anybody who really tried to think out what this country would be undertaking if it involved itself in the acceptance of the Resolution. At any rate, it was a very dangerous thing for a country to give its formal assent to a vital word as to the meaning of which it had no idea. It became necessary to introduce into the clause some word which would mean something to the literal Anglo-Saxon mind.

It was essential to study the two final clauses of the Resolution in their final form if one was to understand the direction in which the League was trending in its policy of disarmament. Those two clauses, which were introduced on the representations of the British Delegation, had the effect of emphasising the direction in which the policy of the League had been moving, namely, towards regional agreements. The Resolution pointed out that it was necessary to lay aside the hope that by any rotund formula to be arrived at in a single negotiation in so many months it was possible to solve the greatest of all human problems. It recommended that after failing in the direct attack and in other ways, an effort should be made to look at each particular region and each particular circumstance in which it was possible to hope for an agreement for security between States. Thus, winning the ground slowly inch by inch, the territory could be conquered which the League had failed to conquer by a swift advance. By a gradual advance, pushed here and there, wherever it was found that the opposition of the forces which made for war were weak, victory might be won by slow but sure experience. That was a method which might succeed or which might fail. At any rate, it was a method which had not been tried yet.

He would like to have said something about the technical activities of the League this year, but time did not serve. When it was apparent that there was no very great political sensation to occupy the Assembly, those who were concerned with the humble technical activities of the League cherished a momentary hope that this year the Assembly might be prepared to devote rather

more attention to them. But unfortunately that was not to be. He must content himself with saying that the cause of the control of the opium traffic and the work dealing with slavery were advanced. A most important step was made in working out the mechanism by which the League was to fight war, when the Finnish Resolution was formally adopted. The effect of that Resolution was that the nations of great financial strength would be prepared, in the event of a war of aggression being undertaken against any Member State, to put their credit at the disposal of the Member State and to solve its financial problems for it in order to enable it to maintain itself. That was a practical measure for the mobilisation of the forces of peace against war. This country undertook to countersign that scheme subject to the reasonable condition that it was approved by a majority of other States and by all the States of financial strength which ought to share the burden of it, and that it was a part of a general scheme of disarmament.

Always one found at the Assembly the flank attack upon war by the invaluable technical activities of the League was being pressed forward even though the direct attack upon disarmament was checked.

The Assembly began in disappointment; but it ended in much higher heart even than the Assembly of the preceding year.

SIR HARRISON MOORE thought that the position of some of the Dominion Delegations was a little curious. They had the feeling that they were in the League, undoubtedly, but were not entirely of the League. On the other hand, they were of the British Empire, but apparently were not in the British Empire. He was not sure how that condition of things was to be amended; but it was uncomfortable and it might be serious. When Sir Hilton Young referred to the British Empire, was he referring merely to the Delegation which derived its power from the Secretary of State in England, or was he referring to the collection of Delegations which came from different parts of—he was going to say the British Empire, but in the circumstances he hardly knew whether he ought to use that term? The matter was more than one of words. It might lead to quite serious misunderstanding. In the Assembly itself there was no consistency. He remembered that one day two successive speakers from the British Delegation—one of them was Sir Hilton Young—were introduced respectively as a delegate “from the British Empire” and as “of Great Britain.” He recollected seeing Sir Cecil Hurst referred to a few years ago in one number of the proceedings of the League as representing the British Empire, as representing Great Britain, and as representing England. It ought to be made clear that the British

Delegation, in the special sense of the word, was not a British Empire Delegation. After all, the term "British Empire" was, as an official term, not of any great antiquity. The first time it was used in any Treaty was, he believed, in 1919.

MR. C. G. HANCOCK asked why the British Government was unable to sign the Optional Clause, with reservations with regard to maritime law. Although there were reasons for disappointment in connection with the Assembly there were, of course, bright spots. He considered that the Economic Conference was perhaps one of the most important events in Geneva during the present year. Very useful work had been done also in connection with the Codification of International Law.

MR. F. N. KEEN asked why Sir Hilton Young described the main purpose of the League of Nations as being the obtaining of "peace through disarmament." He did not find the word "disarmament" mentioned anywhere in the Preamble to the Covenant. He had noticed from time to time that various people appeared to hold the view that the way in which disarmament was most likely to come was as the indirect result of the activities of the League that were described in the Preamble. Reading the Report of the Third Committee, it seemed to him that the Assembly was desirous of getting back to the Covenant and of working on the basis of the Covenant.

MR. REID asked whether, seeing that the Treaty of Versailles reduced the Navy of Germany to six battleships, six cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats, with fifteen thousand men, and reduced the Army to one hundred thousand men, at the same time doing away with compulsory service, any encouragement had been given to the German statesmen that would enable them to satisfy the German people that in course of time other Navies and Armies would be reduced.

MAJOR WALTER E. ELLIOT said that the technical organisations of the League were not only valuable in themselves but were of enormous importance as indicating the direction in which the work at Geneva should move. Take the Economic Conference. That was hailed by Sir Hilton Young in a most powerful speech at the Assembly as one of the greatest results that the League of Nations had been able to achieve. It was a striking example of seeking to find out how and where it was possible to proceed with the times and not in contradiction to the times. It produced something different from what one could have anticipated when it was started, and it marked a definite step in the progress of Europe towards becoming an economic entity.

The way in which most rapid progress could be made was not by passing resolutions against war but by showing people something better than war. By holding up some ideal which would appeal to

the youth and the active growing intelligences of the age it would be possible to get away from the terrible fascination which war and the practice of war exercised upon them. By such means as the fight against disease and the improvement of the trading conditions of countries by the cutting down of tariffs the method of approach would be found.

DR. MAXWELL GARNETT said that, as he talked to various people, particularly people of other nations, at Geneva, he formed the impression that the great majority of the continental nations would be prepared to go ahead with the programme of disarmament through security and security through arbitration if they could have British co-operation. He would like to put two questions. Sir Hilton Young had referred to the Polish resolution about outlawing aggressive war and declaring that it was an international crime and always had been. He (Dr. Garnett) wanted to know why we should not give some definition of aggressive war which would not alter the Covenant but would at all events impose some moral obligation. Why could not we say that, for the future, the British Empire, or the United Kingdom, would not make war except in defence of its territory (and then only when it was ready to go to arbitration), or in defence of the Covenant under Article XVI, or at the behest of the Council of the League?

His second question related to that interesting clause in the Resolution which Sir Hilton Young had explained so well, namely, the clause which referred to the principal condition for the success of the work of disarmament being that every State should be sure of not having to provide for its security by means of its own armaments, unaided. Was it not possible for this country to increase security in Europe, not by undertaking new obligations, but by setting an example of confidence in the security already provided in the Covenant? He believed that at the Three-Power Naval Conference at the Hôtel des Bergues with the Americans and the Japanese, the British representative said that we needed seventy cruisers to provide for the security of our trade routes. What an impression might be made on the mind of Europe, what an addition to Europe's confidence in the security given by the Covenant, if it were possible for Britain to say that, being sure of not having to provide for the security of its trade routes by its own armaments, unaided, it would not require these seventy cruisers but could do with sixty-nine!

MISS FREDA WHITE thought that the reason why the continental nations received Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech with a certain degree of chilliness was that they considered that Sir Austen was perhaps a little muddled in his mind. When they listened to him saying that we would never depart from the Covenant and from Locarno, they thought that he was affirming our faith in two contradictory agreements, and that worried them. Then they were

rather worried by the antithesis which was set up between the British Empire and the League of Nations. They thought that it was false. They said, "You have just been having a naval limitation conference with America, and it has failed. Why has it failed except on the supposition that some day there might be a war between the British Empire and the United States? You have been playing not for agreement but for security against each other."

MR. G. LOWES DICKINSON said that he would be very glad if it were possible for Sir Hilton Young to say why the British Government declined to have anything to do with compulsory arbitration and with the signing of what was known as the Optional Clause. Sir Austen Chamberlain had stated that if this country accepted compulsory arbitration for legal disputes, that is to say, the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it would disrupt the British Empire. He had never heard any explanation of that statement. In declining to sign the clause this country was saying, in effect, "There is no case on which we will bind ourselves not, ultimately, to go to war." There was an opening in the Covenant for war when conciliation failed, and he thought that so long as the British Empire presented the appearance of saying, "We will keep this loophole open as long as we can," the position in which it found itself was one that looked very bad. If the reason why this country was prevented from doing what France and Germany had done was the uncertainty of international law, that surely applied equally to those countries.

THE CHAIRMAN, THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF LYTTON, said that when he was in Geneva, the first thing that struck him as interesting was to find that there still remained in the minds of the Delegations of most of the nations there assembled a firm and undiminished belief in the value of the general security rather than of the regional security, and a great desire on the part of nearly all the nations to go back to the Protocol of 1924 in which so much faith had been placed and by which so many hopes had been raised. He thought that the reason for that was to be found in the fact that in the minds of most of the smaller nations represented at Geneva there still existed a great sense of insecurity. One was apt to regard the League of Nations as an organisation set up for the purpose of bringing war to an end and substituting other methods for settling international disputes; but the League was really called into existence for a more limited purpose. It might be that if it accomplished that purpose it would end by accomplishing the greater one. It had at present a much smaller object and a very definite one, namely, to preserve, in so far as they were based upon justice, the Treaties which brought the Great War to an end, and, so far as experience proved that there were elements of injustice in them, to rectify the defects in those Treaties, when the time was ripe and when public opinion was favourable, by methods other than

a resort to arms. The League of Nations, therefore, was really the trustee of the Treaties of Versailles and the Trianon. Those Treaties created a number of small States which were given an independent existence. These States knew perfectly well that they were absolutely incapable of maintaining their existence apart from the League of Nations. Countries such as Poland, Latvia, Esthonia and Czechoslovakia looked to the League. Year by year when the Assembly met they tried to secure some measure of common agreement from all the great Powers to preserve their existence in case they should be attacked. In spite of repeated disappointments, in spite of the experience of the past that there were nations unable to give them that general security, every year they hoped for it and returned to the attempt.

The next thing that impressed him was the novel experience of finding himself in an assembly composed of very divergent elements, the rule of whose business was that unanimity had to be secured on every occasion and on every subject. Without unanimity nothing could be done. Ordinarily one was accustomed in deliberative assemblies to a state of affairs in which there was always a majority and in which the majority was always able to impose its will on the minority. At the Assembly every Delegate was perfectly free to state the point of view of his nation. After each nation had expressed its point of view and the necessity arose of bringing the different views together into some resolution, it was the business of the Chairman of the Committee and of the Rapporteur on the subject to bring in, if possible, everything that was capable of reconciliation. The method pursued by the League was not to strike out everything controversial, but to find if possible a form of agreement which would include all the points of view. It was only when that point was reached that it was incumbent upon all the protagonists to modify their particular national point of view to such an extent as to enable agreement to be reached. The Third Committee, which dealt with the most difficult subject of all, was, fortunately, presided over by a very able man, Dr. Beneš of Czechoslovakia. Thanks largely to his chairmanship and also to the obligation to agree under which all the members of the Committee were working, the Resolution finally produced embodied all the points of view. In the early days of the Committee it appeared as if the German and French objects were so far apart that agreement was unattainable; but in the end the wishes of both were met. It was important to remember that though progress was slow and must be slow when unanimity was necessary, nevertheless the obligation to agree did not prevent progress, and every year progress was being made. It was all the more valuable because it was unanimous.

It was very much borne in upon the delegates at Geneva that though opinion at Geneva would probably always be somewhat in advance of public opinion in any particular State, nevertheless Geneva could not go beyond the point to which the nations represented there were willing to follow. Therefore it was of the utmost importance

that public opinion in the countries which sent delegates to Geneva should be enlightened as to the work done there, and should be told of the spirit in which the delegates met, and reminded that although it was very easy to be patriotic and national at home one could not talk in the same way at Geneva. Ultimately no work could be done unless the public opinion of the countries represented was behind the delegates. Therein lay the value of meetings such as the present and of the work which the League of Nations Union did in the way of enlightening people as to what the League was trying to do, and as to the decisions which the representatives were called upon to take part in and to accept.

SIR HILTON YOUNG, in reply, said that in using the phrase " British Empire " he was following the procedure of the League, which chose the description " British Empire " for the Delegation.

With regard to the challenge as to the Government's policy on the matter of arbitration and the Optional Clause, he had no authority to make any statement of Government policy. Speaking in his personal capacity, and not as a member of the Delegation, he would say that those who suspected the British Empire of keeping open a loophole to make war were most completely misrepresenting the state of affairs, which was that the British Empire was struggling to keep open a loophole which might save it from having to go to war when its own people were opposed to it.

Mr. Keen had challenged the statement as to the principal object of the League being to further the cause of peace by disarmament. He (Sir Hilton Young) did not know that that statement could be based upon any official document. He could only say that those moral purposes of the League to which reference had been made might be described perhaps rather as its passive purpose; but he did not think that anybody could doubt that its active purpose was to further the cause of peace by any process by which it could be furthered. He cordially agreed with the statements which had been made as to the general tendency of the Assembly this year having been to turn back to the Covenant and endeavour to fortify it.

Dr. Garnett had referred to the necessity of making a great gesture of confidence in the Covenant. Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech at the Assembly was such a gesture. Might not this country say that by what it had done in the direction of disarmament it had made a gesture of practical confidence in the Covenant?

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Survey of International Affairs, 1925. Vol. I. *The Islamic World since The Peace Settlement.* By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. 1927. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 4 Maps. 611 pp. 25s. To members of the Institute : 18s.)

THIS volume is devoted to the affairs of the Islamic world from the conclusion of the War to the end of 1925. But at many points Professor Toynbee has wisely introduced notices of earlier developments which have produced important consequences since 1922. The volume is long; but the subject is immense and could hardly have been made clear to the general reader if the scale of the narrative had been much reduced. Although the main events of Islamic history in these years are connected with the fortunes of a small number of Islamic States lying in North-west Africa and in the Middle East, these events have been complicated by the existence of large Muslim minorities which, though ruled by non-Muslim Powers, are interested in the fate of the Holy Places and desire to maintain the spiritual unity of Islam. The activity of these minorities cannot be altogether ignored in a survey of international politics, although they have no international status.

At the very outset we are confronted with the question whether the revival of the Caliphate in any shape or form is still a possibility. There are in existence three deposed Caliphs. But there is no Muslim Power which shows any desire to support any of these three or to put forward a new claimant. Mr. Toynbee points out that Abdul Hamid asserted his religious hegemony simply to increase the prestige of the Ottoman sultan in his own dominions. The Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the Turkish National Assembly in 1924 with the precise object of preventing the rehabilitation of the despotic sultanate by the support of Muslim minorities in India and Russia. It is not likely to be restored in its old home until the Turkish Republic is dissolved. The congresses held at Mecca and at Cairo in 1926 appear to have been convinced that there was no prospect of establishing a Caliph elsewhere, at all events in the near future. The Cairo congress resolved, it is true, that a Caliphate was desirable if it could be re-established without creating divisions between Muslim peoples. But this could hardly come to pass except through a decision, on the part of the rulers of Turkey, to rescind the law of 1924. The present rulers of Turkey will not do this. They have committed themselves too far in a westernising policy. They have adopted the civil code of Switzerland and the criminal code of Italy. They have abolished polygamy and introduced civil marriage; they have unveiled the Turkish woman and admitted her to the University of Constantinople. In other and more startling innovations they have affronted the old religion. The Gregorian calendar has been introduced; the dates of Ramadan are astronomically determined; a graven image has been erected in honour of at least one Turkish statesman; the wearing of hats has been made compulsory even for private individuals; the monastic orders have been abolished, and ecclesiastical schools and colleges are now under State control. In fact the Turks have been ordered by their rulers to "become as other

peoples." It remains to be seen whether this injunction will be obeyed in the spirit as well as in the letter. For, as Mr. Toynbee reminds us, the driving force of these reforms is not liberalism but nationalism. And the fruits of nationalism are not always unlike those of the old régime. The reforms have been accepted as a short cut to the revival of national power. The old habit of eliminating inconvenient minorities has survived, and here at all events we can see evidence of a religious fanaticism in the masses if not in the rulers, which may presently become menacing to the new régime. Meanwhile the peasants ignore the official emancipation of their womankind, and probably much else of the reforming legislation; and the religious authorities preserve an ominous silence. What do these classes really think about the new Republic? Would they welcome the appearance of a new Caliph?

Mr. Toynbee observes that the Turkish experiment, and also the constitutional movements in Syria, Iraq, Persia and Afghanistan are probably of less consequence than the general endeavour, in these Islamic countries, to adopt the material technique of Western civilisation (p. 24). This is a proposition which few of his readers will dispute. It leads us to ask whether the economic progress of the independent States or of the mandated territories in the Middle East has been accelerated by this passion for Western ideas. Mr. Toynbee's narrative does not give much ground for an optimistic answer. These years (1920-5) have not been favourable to commercial or industrial enterprises; but the Islamic Governments seem to have done singularly little to prepare the way for a trade revival. Afghanistan, it is true, has sent her students at the expense of the State to attend courses in "war, engineering and technology" at various French and Russian institutions. The Amir has imported French, Italian and German experts to advise on the exploitation of national resources; and trade-agents of the U.S.S.R. are established, with diplomatic privileges, at Kabul (pp. 546, 565). Persia has concluded treaties with Afghanistan (1923) and with Turkey (1926) which are intended to promote commercial intercourse as well as other objects (pp. 545-6). Late in 1923 a customs convention was signed between the Najd and Iraq (p. 336). The greatest commercial interest in the Middle East is still, as it was before the War, that of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which in 1923 had about 20,000 native employees in South Persia (p. 541). Further developments may be expected from the concession granted by Iraq to the Turkish Petroleum Company (1925), in which, it need hardly be said, no Turkish interests are involved, and the success of this Company would, of course, be beneficial to Iraq. But there have been no comparable developments, of oil or other natural products in the territories mandated to Great Britain and France.

Mr. Leonard Stein contributes to this volume a sympathetic but candid description of the Zionist experiments in Palestine. They have been hindered by native opposition and by native speculators in land; and, so far, they have done more to increase the urban population than to develop the agricultural resources of the country. The agricultural colonists are still, for the most part, dependent on the philanthropic support which their co-religionists in other lands have so generously provided (pp. 366-85). Indeed, we are tempted to ask whether it is not the comparative failure of the colonisation schemes which has led to the recent decline of anti-Zionist agitation among the Palestinian Arabs.

The political agitations of Syria engross Mr. Toynbee's attention to such an extent that we hear little from him of the economic position. But that little is discouraging. The great schemes for utilising the head-waters of the Tigris and Euphrates to irrigate the French mandated territories appear to be still in suspense (p. 466). The Arabian trade of Damascus has been severely damaged by the Anglo-French boundary agreement of 1923 (p. 327); and the ill-judged assimilation of the Syrian to the French currency (1920), which deprived Syria of the benefits of a gold standard, has reacted disastrously on Syrian credit, in spite of recent concessions which have authorised the use of gold currencies for most commercial contracts (pp. 396-8). These facts show, at all events, that neither the principle of nationality nor the system of mandates can work miracles in the economic sphere. The commercial and industrial development of the Middle East is bound to be gradual, and is likely to be chequered with mistakes and failures.

We have touched only upon what appears to be the central theme of this volume. The second part of it contains a full and interesting account of the reactions against European rule in North-west Africa, especially in Libya and Morocco. The third part is chiefly remarkable for a full and suggestive account of Anglo-Egyptian relations, in which special attention is paid to the controversies regarding the status of the Sudan and the allocation of the Nile Waters. Among the historical excursions to which reference has been already made, special attention is due to those on the history of the Caliphate (pp. 25-42), of the earlier troubles of Spain in the Rif (pp. 105-11), of the rise of the Wahhabi power (pp. 271-84), and of the political fortunes of Syria (pp. 347-8). In his account of the mandated territory of Syria Mr. Toynbee has many opportunities of using his knowledge of contemporary history and of geographical conditions to illustrate the events of remote antiquity. His narrative nowhere in the volume sinks to the level of a "diurnal of occurrences," but when he writes of Syria he shows his best quality as an historian.

The Survey for 1925 is appearing in two volumes, and the second volume has been delegated to other hands. In undertaking single-handed one whole volume, dealing with so vast a subject over a period of several years Mr. Toynbee has done as much as could be expected of any writer, or more.

H. W. C. DAVIS.

Ores and Industry in the Far East. By FOSTER BAIN. 1927. (New York : Council on Foreign Relations. 8vo. viii+239 pp. \$3.50.) Special price to members of the Institute, 10s.

WE are indebted for this valuable book to the labours of a Conference group of the Council on Foreign Relations which devoted its session of 1925-26 to a study of the mineral resources of the Far East. The title is not one which will attract the general reader, but in spite of many pages filled with statistics, maps and diagrams, and portentous geological terms, no recent book on China deserves to be more widely read. It is of the highest importance that the results of this illuminating survey should become part of the accepted stock of common knowledge about China. At present the true facts are known to a few geologists, vaguely suspected by some others, and utterly unknown to the general public. All Eastern countries, except India, are included in the survey, but China is the only one that really matters.

From the earliest days the myth of the gorgeous East has laid hold of the imaginations of men. Silks and spices and jewels came from the Far East, and Marco Polo told of great cities and teeming millions. It was hard to realise that these were signs not of wealth but of grinding poverty. Owing to her poverty and the deficiency of means of transport, China had nothing to export but the light and portable luxuries of the few. When the industrial revolution came in the West and built up a new civilisation based on coal and iron, the myth still persisted and the illimitable mineral resources of China became a cardinal article of popular belief. Government policies are built on popular beliefs and, as a French geologist, Le Clère, lured France into the mountains of Yunnan, so possibly Baron von Richthofen was responsible for the Battle of the Concessions and Germany's mailed fist adventure in Shantung. The writings of Richthofen fixed firmly in the popular mind the belief in the untold mineral wealth of China. He was an eminent geologist, but he fell into the universal error of all the early observers of mistaking widespread occurrences of minerals for abundance. The facts are far otherwise, and it is pleasant, at a time when the Chinese have fallen into such bad repute, to learn that we are indebted for our present knowledge of the facts to the labours of Chinese geologists. By one of those paradoxes with which students of Chinese affairs become familiar, at a time when China was apparently in a state of hopeless and ever-growing turmoil and chaos, great progress was in fact being made in one of the most difficult fields of human endeavour.

In 1913 that great ruler Yuan Shih-kai organised the Geological Survey of China under two well-known Chinese geologists, V. K. Ting and W. H. Wong, who had received their training in the Universities of the West, the former at Glasgow and the latter at Louvain.

"Recognising the size and responsibility of the task committed to them and the need of an adequately trained staff, they spent the first two years in the conduct of a geological institute at the University in Peking, training some thirty selected students in the principles of modern geology and methods of making surveys. From among the graduates of this course eighteen were selected who became the working staff of the new survey. Ting and Wong proved to be not only good geologists and good organisers but inspiring leaders, and the young men who have worked with and under them have given excellent account of themselves. With inadequate appropriations, poor and uncertain pay, amid civil war, and faced by every discouragement, this little force has done a surprising amount of scientific work fully comparable in quantity to that turned out by similar organisations in other lands under happier circumstances."

The metals and minerals which are essential in modern industry are firstly the "tonnage" minerals, iron, coal, petroleum and sulphur. Many others are essential, such as tungsten, vanadium, manganese, copper, lead, zinc, aluminium, tin, antimony, mercury, etc., but the quantity required is relatively so small that they can be transported from any distance. But coal and iron—the basis of all industry—are measured in millions of tons, and China can never be industrialised because she has no iron. This startling fact is as yet but little known—for popular beliefs die hard—but it is no longer in doubt. "The past twenty years have seen an intensive search for iron from Siberia to India; and since an iron ore body suitable for modern industry must

contain millions of tons, it is sufficiently large to preclude many being overlooked when intelligently searched for by competent engineers."

With regard to coal there is still an element of doubt. The estimated coal reserves, in millions of metric tons, of the United States are 3,838,657, of Canada 819,465, of the United Kingdom 48,034. Mr. Bain declares that China undoubtedly contains one of the world's great reserves of coal, and he accepts the figure 996,612, which would place China second only to the United States. This estimate was made in 1913 by N. F. Drake, "an American geologist and mining engineer long resident in China." In the same year K. Inouyé, an eminent Japanese geologist, Director of the Imperial Geological Survey of Japan, estimated China's coal reserves at 39,565 millions of metric tons, or only about one-thirtieth of Drake's figure. In 1916 V. K. Ting pronounced that Drake's estimate was of the "right order of magnitude" though his figures for individual provinces were very uncertain. "It is correct to say," wrote Ting, "that as far as present knowledge goes, 100,000 million metric tons is a fair minimum figure, but the real reserve is probably ten times as large." In the years since these estimates were made the staff of the Geological Survey of China has made extensive studies of a number of coalfields, and W. H. Wong, the present director of the Survey, prepared and published an estimate in 1921. This was 23,345 million of metric tons, less than Inouyé's figure and only slightly over one-fortieth of Drake's estimate. "No later general estimates have been made, but individual fields have been studied, and with few exceptions the amount of coal actually present has been found to be less than originally estimated." Drake, for example, estimated the probable reserves in the well-known coalfield in Yih sien in South Shantung at 1,838,000,000 metric tons, but when it came to actually opening a colliery, "concealed faults and rapid changes of thickness of the coal bed were found, with the result that it was only after considerable drilling that a block of 20,000,000 tons of coal properly situated for mining was outlined." Similarly eminent geologists made glowing estimates of the coal reserves in Yunan, believing that it was a simple plateau when in fact it was much complicated by deep folding and faulting. All the evidence seems to point to the fact that Wong's estimate is much nearer the truth than Drake's, and Mr. Bain's evident preference for the latter is the only serious criticism that can be levelled against his book.

In two important minerals, antimony and tungsten, China is pre eminent, providing eighty per cent. of the world's supply of the former and sixty-three per cent. of the latter. Malaya, Siam and the Dutch East Indies provide sixty per cent. of the world's tin, but in all the other minerals and metals that enter into modern industry the Far East plays, and is ever destined to play, but an insignificant part.

There is another factor besides that of mineral resources which has to be taken into account in estimating whether a country can build up the industries which support the civilisation of Europe and America, and that is the human factor. Mr. Bain accordingly devotes a chapter of extraordinary interest and value to an analysis of the psychology and social organisation of the Chinese so far as these create conditions affecting the development of China's mineral resources. More popular fallacies about China here go by the board for, with a teeming and industrious population, there may yet be a scarcity of labourers upon such terms as are necessary to sustain large-scale industrial undertakings. Each worker must keep in step with the economic and social

unit of which he forms a part. Farmers may turn coolies in winter but cannot be tempted down a mine in summer, so that to recruit a capable force of miners, though not impossible, involves much difficulty and expense and requires a remaking of the social structure. Employers know well that low-priced labour is not necessarily cheap. Many factors militate against the efficiency of Chinese labour; bad food, bad housing, bad sanitation, all of which the Chinese cheerfully endure because there are other things, such as fine funerals, male children, and gambling, which they like better; the merging of the individual in the family takes the pressure off the individual but removes the incentive to effort; certain ingrained habits of mind find expression in an indifference to accuracy, a passion for squeeze and a striking reluctance to doing something for nothing. The laws and the administration correspond to the character of the people and result in inadequate means of transport, insecurity of life and property, and an absence of all central authority. The present chaos is not a mere passing phase as many people imagine. Political instability is an essential concomitant of the social fabric of Chinese life—a fabric which is imbedded in the traditions and the sanctions of a moral code reaching back for more than two thousand years. These are some of the formidable difficulties that lie in the way of developing modern industries in China.

The book is well indexed, and Mr. J. W. Frey has compiled a very full and useful bibliography. On p. 46 "one-twentieth" should be "one-fortieth," and W. H. Wong published his estimate of coal reserves in 1921 and not in 1924 (p. 208). These, however, are not serious blemishes on a careful and scholarly work on which the Council of Foreign Relations is to be heartily congratulated.

The British in China and Far Eastern Trade. By C. A. MIDDLETON SMITH, M.Sc., Professor of Civil and Mechanical Engineering in the University of Hongkong. 1927. (London: Constable & Co. 8vo. 295 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THIS book was first published seven years ago; it is now re-issued. It should rightly have been rewritten, for those seven years have seen great changes—the development of new forces, the abandonment of old axioms. In 1920 British trade in China seemed to be a solid and progressive business, firmly established on the foundation of the treaties. There had been some rumbles of the coming storm—not loud enough, however, to alarm our author. There had been the War, with its disastrous repercussions on European prestige in Asia; there had been the abolition of German and Austrian extra-territorial rights; "Young China" had refused to sign the Versailles Treaty; all China had joined in the great anti-Japanese outcry, which first aroused the new Chinese nationalism. Professor Middleton Smith, like very many others, failed to see what these events portended; and so it is honest and rather naive of him to repeat (without any explanation or apologia) the chirpy optimism of 1920 (that fallacious year!) now, at this time, when the treaties are visibly crumbling and British trade in China is in a very bad way indeed. The contrast between 1920 and 1927 is too great to be ignored; yet this reprint ignores it, and that is the book's obvious weakness.

The chief interest of this book is to be found in the historical and personal notes, which (though dealing with matters familiar to all

British in the Far East) are not readily available elsewhere for the uninitiated. Here they can learn about Jardine, Matheson and Co, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, Butterfield and Swire and the Union Insurance Society of Canton; here they can discover why such names as those of Sir John Jordan, Sir Richard Dane, Sir Robert Hart, Sir Thomas Jackson, Mr. (now Sir) E. W. Pearce, Dr. Robert Morrison, Dr. G. E. Morrison and others are famous from Harbin to Pakhoi. There is an interesting chapter on the career of a typical Chinese South Sea millionaire, Towkay Loke Yew. Other chapters deal with British Chambers of Commerce, Banks and Exchange, Hongkong, Shanghai and the Yangtse Valley, Shipping, Railways, Mines, Newspapers, etc.

Although this is rather a scrapbook, and although many of the author's judgments have so far been stultified by subsequent events, and although his statistics (of which there are a good many) are at least nine years old, yet there is enough interesting and original material to justify a reissue of the book—and perhaps to prepare the way for a better one, which (and this holds good of all books about China) should be provided with an adequate map.

China and the Occident. By G. N. STEIGER, Ph.D. 1927. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 8vo. xiii + 349 pp. 16s.)

THIS book, better described by its less imposing sub-title, "The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement," was originally submitted in skeleton as a thesis for the Ph.D. degree at Harvard. It has since been expanded into the present volume, and is published by Yale University under the terms of the Mather Memorial Trust. The author in his preface modestly expresses the hope that his work may contribute to a clearer appreciation of the modern problems of China and the West. Dr. Williams of Yale in the Foreword which he contributes is less sanguine. He commends the writer for "quite wisely abstaining from contrasts and comparisons with the turmoil in China to-day." If the treatise is to be regarded as a serious footnote to history, this seems a somewhat faint form of praise. But perhaps it is intended to cover the fact that Dr. Steiger, in not having spent any period of residence in China, lacks the condition precedent for a real understanding of Chinese affairs and Chinese mentality.

This limitation being borne in mind, it may be said that in a clear and refreshing style the author has worked out a novel and interesting theory as to the development of the Boxer outbreak. He has, however, allowed himself to be carried away by his theory, and has distorted facts to make them fit in accordingly, at the same time revealing an anti-foreign bias which refuses to credit the foreign Powers with any virtues, or the natives of China with any shortcomings. This is an attitude which in the United States is by some thought to make for popularity in China.

As examples of the bias referred to, the following passages are significant:

Dr. Steiger opines (p. 212) that at the outset the Boxer danger was unreal, because the only centres of excitement in Peking early in June 1900 were the foreign Chanceries. He appears not to have realised that this concentration of interest was due to the fact that the Ministers concerned understood the danger which threatened the foreigners for whom they were responsible, and which they were doing their best

to avert. The Chinese in Peking were calm because they did not imagine that any danger threatened them from the Boxers.

Again (p. 221), he affects to question which party began the actual fighting at Peking. The importance of this point is not great, but the fact is not open to doubt. The Legations were from the first in a state of *defence*, and the onslaughts on the hastily contrived breast-works came from the Boxers.

He blames (p. 222) the foreigners for firing on the Boxers in Peking. This stricture, however, ignores the fact that the besieged having rescued the native Christians, were not unnaturally much roused by the scenes of revolting cruelty of which they were the eye-witnesses. Why should they deserve censure for firing on Boxers who in full uniform were actively engaged in destroying and looting mission property and slaughtering Chinese Christians? The author's caustic comment on this episode runs thus: "These parties turned at times, from their humanitarian purpose (of rescue), to the more exciting sport of hunting down and exterminating bands of the I-ho Chuan" (or Boxers). In the term "sport," and in the exaggerated blood-thirstiness ascribed to the besieged, the bias of the writer stands revealed.

Turning to constitutional points, the author shows a singular ignorance of salient facts, owing to his inability to conceive of democracy other than that familiar in the United States. For this reason, he entirely mistakes the character of the Chinese Imperial Government. It was not a democracy, except in so far as the highest official posts were open to the humblest youth of talent. The Emperor was a true autocrat who had unlimited power both in theory and in practice. It is absurd to say that he could not impose taxes at will, as witness *likin*, which was imposed to meet the expenses of suppressing the Taiping Rebellion.

Further, the administration of the Empire's finances was not, as stated on p. 283, placed completely under foreign control by the Protocol of 1901—only the Maritime Customs were and a few native Custom Houses. So far as the remainder (and by far the greater part) of the Empire's finances were concerned, *e.g.* land tax and *likin*, the Chinese Government remained at liberty to administer them as they chose.

As a crowning instance of evidence wrested to fit a preconceived theory, it is boldly asserted (p. 242) that the authenticity of the Edict to kill foreigners rests upon a shaky foundation. But, apart from the diary of Ching Shan, which is explicit on the point, the sentences passed on Yuan Chang and Hsu Ching for tampering with the Edict, and their attested valedictory letters put the matter beyond doubt. Further, it is not surprising, as the author asks us to believe, that foreigners did not get a glimpse of this document addressed in confidence to Governors and Viceroyalties which the Chinese Government was at a later date only too anxious to suppress and disavow.

Finally, it was not a "mistake" on the part of the foreign diplomats to call the Boxers "rebels." That was a euphemism consonant with the Chinese character and designed to save the face of the Chinese Government and of the Court. An elementary knowledge of Chinese mentality would have saved the author from this error.

R. P. SCOTT.

Annuaire de la Société des Nations. Edited by GEORGE OTTLIK. 1927.
(Geneva: Payot & Co. 25 Swiss francs.)

THE shelves of every library dealing with foreign affairs are already weighed down by volumes on the League of Nations, for that institution has a surprising number of protagonists and not a few bitter enemies who have already published accounts of its activities as they see them. But, despite this mass of information, cold facts about the League are difficult to discover, and there may even be members of the Institute who are not very clear as to the difference, for example, between the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva and the League of Nations Sections in the various Foreign Offices. The latest list of commissions and sub-commissions sent out from Geneva is seventy-three pages in length, and although one or two books, such as Mr. Maurice Fanshawe's excellent *Reconstruction*, give brief details of the League's activities and brief lists of the members of its commissions, the need of a specific League Almanack has become a pressing one. Mr. George Ottlik, Hungarian diplomat and journalist, has had the courage to attempt to supply that need, and it is probable that in a few years Embassies, Legations and newspaper offices will find his Almanack of the League of Nations as indispensable as in the past they have found the *Almanac de Gotha*.

The *Annuaire*, which at present appears only in French, is a volume of eleven hundred pages, divided into five parts. The first part deals with the constitution and organisation of the League; the second gives a list of all persons who collaborate in its different committees; the third is a chronological table of all the work achieved by the League since its foundation; the fourth contains details of the different States Members, of the part they have played in League affairs and of the attitude towards the League of those countries which are not Members of it; and the fifth part is a "Who's Who" containing some three thousand names of people who have in one way or another been connected with the League. The reader can find at a glance the peculiarly elusive rules of procedure of the Assembly and of the Council; he has a valuable list of the various projects which preceded the compilation of the Covenant; he may find full details of the composition of the Secretariat and the rules which govern its members; there is even information about the various international associations which may be said to be remotely connected with the work or the aims of the League. It will be seen from this brief outline of the *Annuaire* that Mr. Ottlik has attempted an immense task and, if he has succeeded, it is because he has rigorously excluded all partisanship.

VERNON BARTLETT.

The Stabilisation of the Mark. By DR. HJALMAR SCHACHT. 1927.
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 8vo. 247 pp. 8s. 6d.)

DR. SCHACHT, who was responsible for the measures by which the German mark was first stabilised and who has presided over the Reichsbank ever since, provides a most important and illuminating history of events in Germany since the War. His book is vividly and lucidly written and at times rises to a high pitch of excitement. Dr. Schacht presents us with a clear picture of himself, at times consciously, at times unconsciously. Strength and determination of the highest degree and the power to brush aside irrelevancies were needed in order to achieve the heroic task of stabilising the German

currency at a time when no foreign credit was forthcoming, when the Dawes Committee had not yet met, and when the future development of the Reparation problem was utterly unforeseeable. It was only natural that the stringent measures which were necessary should provoke powerful opposition; Dr. Schacht's lively description of it suggests to the mind not only his own force of character, but also the impossibility, in the absence of a very good man at the head of affairs, of stemming the tide earlier.

Dr. Schacht is a believer in the gold standard. But he endorses the view that the achievement of a gold standard should not be the final aim of monetary policy. "To say so much [*i.e.* to commend a metallic standard] is not to say that the heads of the great central banks of issue cannot and should not endeavour even more than before to avoid fluctuations in the price level by wise distribution and employment of the gold on which the currencies are based" (p. 208). We may hope that Dr. Schacht does not merely pay lip-service to this view. Whether he genuinely believes in it is of great moment for the monetary future.

In his chapter on Foreign Credits (ch. ix.) Dr. Schacht is almost guilty of confusion. It seems probable that the Transfer Committee will find means of payment largely through foreign loans to Germany. This according to Dr. Schacht will be contrary to the spirit of the Dawes plan, which contemplated a genuine export surplus as a basis of Reparation payments. It recognised, he admits, that some foreign capital would be needed, but only for certain specific and limited purposes (p. 231). Yet if Germany is able to attract large foreign loans for economic reconstruction and expansion, that surely is to her advantage. It would, it is true, make an export surplus impossible. But is this a reason for discontinuing Reparation payments? Dr. Schacht writes: "The Experts' report nowhere contemplates the use of foreign capital for other objects, least of all for transfer purposes. . . . What foreign capitalist would lend a *pfennig* to Germany if he saw that his money was being used for direct payment of the Reparation tribute instead of for the strengthening of the economic capacity of Germany?" But that is begging the question. The foreign capital will be lent for genuine economic purposes, probably in increasing quantities. Consequently there will be no export surplus. Therefore, according to Dr. Schacht the Transfer Committee must not transfer because it must not use the *Devisen* arising out of these loans! If only Dr. Schacht could persuade the Transfer Committee of these opinions, it would undoubtedly be to the advantage of Germany, and it would probably be to the advantage of the world, and it would be one of the most magnificent exploitations of human muddle-headedness!

Of course everyone will agree with Dr. Schacht that the Transfer Committee must not transfer so much as to make the payment of interest on these loans impossible. "The political payments ought not to be transferred at the cost of the payments to the private creditors."

R. F. HARROD.

Versailles. By KARL FRIEDRICH NOWAK. 1927. (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik. 8vo. 345 pp.)

THIS work must be regarded as a continuation of the author's *Der Zusammenbruch*, in which he gave a very vivid account of the collapse

of the Central Powers. He now continues the narrative with a description first of the Armistice negotiations and then of the Peace Conference in Paris and the final submission of the Germans. It shows those characteristics with which readers of Dr. Nowak's books will be familiar—a vivid impressionism in a style which, always unconventional and bizarre, sometimes, though not invariably, succeeds in the effort to give a successful and enduring picture. But the book is less successful than his earlier works. The beginning and the end can indeed be read with profit; here, where he is depending chiefly on German sources, he is on comparatively sure ground, and the account of the discussion at Weimar on the signing of the Treaty is useful. The same cannot be said of his description of the Peace Conference itself. He has not sufficient knowledge to succeed in his ambitious endeavour. A careful reading seems to show that for the greater part of the book he has depended almost entirely on Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, but Mr. Baker is not a reliable guide. He looks at the whole thing, as he was justified in doing, merely from the point of view of President Wilson; everything which did not immediately concern him is neglected and much which did concern him is very seriously misrepresented. Much which Mr. Baker attributed to a designing struggle against the Wilsonian ideals—as, for instance, the attempt at the end of February to press on with the preliminaries of peace—was really due to quite different causes. As a result the whole proportion of the book is wrong, and much which is essential is omitted. Quite apart from this, Dr. Nowak has not succeeded in giving a true picture of what the Conference was like. There is no evidence of any careful study of the numerous other available books. The general account of the procedure and the working of the Conference is confused and often almost unintelligible. There are also many singular errors. He gives, for instance, a quite false definition of so important a matter as the Monroe doctrine. It is a smaller point, but not unimportant, when he tells us that Mr. Lloyd George when coming to Paris brought "a swarm of soldiers with him." It is not true that Foch at the beginning of November desired to continue the War; on the contrary, he did not oppose the proposal for an armistice. Moreover, his picture of the final scene on July 28th is incorrect; he describes the German representatives as "lonely men in civilian costume among countless uniforms and diplomatic coats shining with gold." Of course no one except the soldiers, who were in service costume, wore uniform on this occasion, as he might easily have found out by reference to newspaper files.

Truth: a Path to Justice and Reconciliation. By "VERAX." 1926. (London: Cecil Palmer. 8vo. 293 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE claims implied in the title of this book are far-reaching. As a thoroughly one-sided presentation of the German case in regard to the origin, conduct and results of the War it may perhaps serve to counterbalance equally biased presentations of the Allied case, but it is questionable if this type of work is very likely to lead to "justice and reconciliation." The author prefers to remain anonymous, styling himself by a somewhat ambitious pseudonym. The only clue to his nationality is a tendency to refer to Great Britain as "we," though the English of the work bears certain undoubted marks of

foreign origin. Personally we always feel that propagandists should come out into the open.

The book deals among other things with European history from 1855-1914 with special reference to the responsibility for the Franco-Prussian war; the conduct of the German army in Belgium; the treatment of prisoners on both sides; submarine warfare and war in the air; the Treaty of Versailles; the League of Nations; armies of occupation, comparing the behaviour of the Germans in France in 1871-73 with that of the French in Germany since the War; and includes a very detailed description of the events of July 1914.

It is impossible here to enter in detail into the arguments advanced in connection with this comprehensive list of subjects. The work is fairly well documented, though, of course, the authorities are all chosen with regard to the purpose of the book. No new evidence is brought to bear on the question of war-guilt.

H. P. GREENWOOD.

Le Rattachement de l'Autriche à l'Allemagne. By BERTRAND AUERBACH. 1927. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, Editeurs. 8vo. ix + 190 pp. 10.80 frs.)

M. AUERBACH has produced a very useful study on the question of the union of Austria with Germany. It is a matter of much importance on which there is, at any rate in this country, a great diversity of opinion. It is therefore of real value to have a well-informed and well-documented account of the history of the question since the end of 1918. M. Auerbach treats fully the action of the Government of Austria, which on the very day of its establishment passed a law declaring that "German-Austria forms an integral part of the German Republic." He shows the motives by which Otto Bauer and the Socialists, who were at the moment the ruling element, were influenced in taking this step, and traces the course of events at Vienna, at Prague and at Paris, which ultimately led to the insertion of the well-known clause in the Treaty of Peace, declaring that the independence of Austria was inalienable without the consent of the League of Nations. This is followed by a chapter on the attempt of the League of Nations to remedy the economic distress of Austria.

The author does not hide his own views, which are those of the whole of the French nation. To quote a speech made in the French Senate:

"L'union avec l'Allemagne? Mais c'est la fondation d'un bloc compact, sans alliage étranger; j'oserais dire un bloc pur allemand, un bloc de soixante-quinze millions d'habitants; c'est Berlin et Vienne unis. C'est la mainmise sur le Danube; c'est le *Drang nach Osten* repris; c'est la Bohême tout entière encerclée et rendue impuissante. C'est bien plus encore: c'est l'Allemagne elle-même allant jusqu'à la Hongrie et s'y accolant. . . . Et c'est la Serbie menacée, et c'est peut-être aussi la Roumanie tentée. . . . Croyez-vous que pour la France . . . il n'y ait pas lieu de craindre que l'Allemagne, se voyant à la tête d'une semblable masse de population et d'un tel surcroît de force, ne cherche à en faire une seconde fois l'usage qu'elle a déjà voulu en faire?" . . .

The one criticism we have to make is that the desire for union on the German side does not merely come from the militant pan-Germans; it goes back, as the author himself recognises, to 1848, when it was shared by the Liberals and the idealists, who to a large extent were influenced by thoughts similar to those which seventy years

later were expressed by President Wilson. To recognise this is, of course, not in the least to approve the scheme, for however idealistic might be the motives of some of those who support it, the author is quite right in pointing out the great dangers which so large an accession of territory by Germany might not improbably bring about.

The Making of a State. By DR. T. G. MASARYK. English version arranged and prepared with an Introduction by H. WICKHAM STEED. 1927. (London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 8vo. 462 pp. 21s.)

THIS work is entirely *sui generis*. It is neither altogether a history of the making of Czechoslovakia, nor altogether a philosophical treatise, but combines much of each. The period in time which Dr. Masaryk covers is from 1914 to 1918 only; neither the struggles of the Czech parties in the old Austria nor the history of the Czechoslovak republic once constituted are touched upon, except incidentally. The story is one of the development of a philosophic determination by political circumstances, and its execution in practice. The determination was to create a democratic Czechoslovak State; the factors behind it were the history of the Czech people, the development of Western democracy, the degeneracy of the Hapsburg monarchy and its rulers, and the reaction of a Slav and a democrat against German militarism and imperialism. More than half the book is concerned with questions which any historian, except the most wide-seeing, might perhaps dismiss as irrelevant, had they not in fact helped to form Czechoslovakia as she is to-day; the ideas of Rousseau, the degeneracy of French literature, the writings of James Joyce, the London cinema. These appear strangely in *The Making of a State*, and we think Mr. Wickham Steed made his one mistake in his otherwise perfect work by changing the title from "The World Revolution." Thus political, social and moral theory occupies many pages of this book, its translation into practice comparatively few; although, since Professor Masaryk was the chief actor in the formation of Czechoslovakia, what data he gives are indispensable to the student of this period of history. We have here the whole history of Professor Masaryk's Odyssey, after he had once made up his mind—characteristically, on moral grounds—that the Czech people were ripe for liberty, and that the European situation being as it was, they could and ought to have it. The campaign consisted at first largely of convincing the Allies of the existence and friendship of a Czechoslovak nation, then in arranging for more active work, an important part of which was the organisation of the systematic desertion of the Czech troops from the Austrian to the Russian forces. Dr. Masaryk had to struggle against almost entire ignorance in England and, in other countries, against perverted ambitions which he must have found even more baffling. Thus the Russian General Alexieff, although "a cautious man of critical mind," suggested a Czech State extending to Trieste and Fiume and taking in Vienna (thus including a large German majority), and a Serbia extending *via* Budapest to Uzhorod on the Russian frontier. It is certainly fortunate that the creator of Czechoslovakia was not merely a clever man, but a wise man in the truest sense of the word.

C. A. MACARTNEY.

Mother India. By KATHARINE MAYO. 1927. (London : Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 391 pp. 10s. 6d.)

IN this book Miss Mayo claims to have made a picture out of living facts of India of to-day which cannot be disproved or shaken. She hopes that her picture will increase the knowledge of her Western readers and that Indian readers will learn from it—even at the cost of some shame and sorrow—what impressions are produced upon a friendly and sympathetic Western observer of the family and social life, institutions, manners and customs of India. In her first chapter Miss Mayo announces that she will leave untouched the realms of religion and politics and the arts, and will confine her inquiry to such workaday problems as public health and its contributory factors. But this promise is not kept and the reader finds that at least half the book is taken up with discussions of religion and politics and history.

This is to be regretted, for Miss Mayo is at her best in grasping and forcibly presenting concrete and physical facts. When she attempts to generalise upon her facts and ventures into the realm of abstractions she is not equally successful or reliable, for, as will be hereafter shown, she is severely handicapped by sentimentality and partisan bias. Another blemish in Miss Mayo's book is the total disregard of courtesy—a virtue which is not less but more imperatively needed in international than in civic relations. It is not at all incompatible with truth telling and plain speaking, as M. André Siegfried demonstrated in his recent book about America. It is not decent to deny to an Oriental or an Asiatic the ordinary courtesy which is granted as a matter of course to a Frenchman or any other member of any European stock.

The earlier chapters are devoted to a discussion of all the evil consequences which result from the fact that sexual cohabitation and marital relations begin in India at abnormally early ages. Students of the Indian social system have long recognised that these customs must injuriously affect the national health and physique. In a passion of indignation at the wrongs borne by her suffering sisters Miss Mayo has thought it her duty to publish the naked hideous facts as to some of the worst evils which result from these customs. Whether the evils described are of normal and daily occurrence as Miss Mayo asserts, or whether they are exceptional, is a question upon which there is much difference of opinion even among medical experts. It is doubtful whether even medical experts could, out of their own experience, make any authoritative general statement. A layman will find it very difficult to form a judgment, but he will find in this book much evidence which shows that the author's emotions have habitually overmastered and clouded her judgment.

Most of the medical testimony as to the horrors of child marriage dates from 1891, and little or nothing is said about the subsequent steady amelioration of public feeling and practice due to the combined influence of legislation and social reform movements. It is well known that the marriage age has been steadily rising in some of the higher castes and that the example set by these castes tends to spread downwards. It is not always the evil customs of the higher castes which are selected for imitation by those lower in the social scale. The chapters in the book which are least marred by exaggeration and prejudice are those which describe the shocking practices connected with childbirth, the cruel social disabilities of the Hindu widow and

of the low castes and untouchables : also the terrible price which is paid in disease and inefficiency for the dense ignorance of the rudiments of hygiene and public health, and the social and religious taboos behind which that ignorance is entrenched. It is devoutly to be wished that the harrowing pictures drawn by Miss Mayo may tempt some American millionaire to endow " Mother India " with the means for inaugurating a systematic campaign against malaria. It is only the other day that millions of American money were offered to the Egyptian Government for archæology—and refused !

It would not be profitable to follow Miss Mayo in her disquisitions upon Indian politics and economics and Indian religious controversies. The reason for this must be explained, for it will at the same time explain the nature of the reception which Miss Mayo's book has had in India. Consciously or unconsciously, she is dominated by an intense prejudice against Hindus which constantly distorts her vision and falsifies her conclusions. Hindus or Hindu institutions, customs, opinions, manners, are hardly ever mentioned without depreciation and contumely and invidious comparisons with the " hardy and virile races of the North," the " hawk-nosed, hawk-eyed " gentry for whom Miss Mayo has an ingenuous and romantic admiration.

The European reader who knows India will be willing, in spite of the growing distaste and distress with which he will read this book, to give the author credit at least for sincerity and enthusiasm. He will note with amusement her credulity and gullibility. Any foreign tourist may be pardoned for such a blunder as the statement that every Indian script has from 200 to 500 characters. But this tourist is shown a cow with only three legs, and some humorist tells her that the owner chopped off the fourth leg because the cow used to kick while she was being milked. Out come the tablets and the story is docketed and labelled " Hindu cruelty to animals " ; and this is only one of many similar absurdities. It is not a matter for wonder that Indian readers should find in this book not a serious contribution to the study of Indian problems, but a deliberate intention to frame an indictment against the greater part of the Indian nation and to hold it up to hatred and contempt.

F. G. PRATT.

Modern India : its Problems and their Solution. By V. H. RUTHERFORD. 1927. (London : Labour Publishing Co. 8vo. xvi + 268 pp. 7s. 6d.)

India To-morrow. By KHUB DEKHITA AGE. 1927. (London : Oxford University Press. 8vo. 87 pp. 3s. 6d.)

Relations of Indian States with the Government of India. By K. M. PANIKKAR. 1927. (London : Martin Hopkinson. 8vo. xxxi + 169 pp. 10s. 6d.)

Rural Economy of India. By R. MUKERJEE. 1926. (London : Longmans, Green. 8vo. xi + 262 pp. 6s. 6d.)

OF Dr. Rutherford's book it is sufficient to say that he is one of the humble disciples of Lenin for whom a new era was inaugurated by the Russian Revolution. His views are all of the familiar Moscow pattern. British rule has ruined India and must be withdrawn at once. The reform schemes are shams defended only by " cowards and hypocrites." Lord Olivier when Secretary of State outrageously mishandled the Indian problem. British statesmen and adminis-

trators are pigmies compared with those intellectual and political giants Mahatma Gandhi and the non-co-operation Swaraj politicians.

Mr. "Age" makes a thoughtful and well-informed survey of the problems which are coming into view as the time draws near for the appointment of the Statutory Commission of 1929—the first and not the least difficult of which will be the personnel of the Commission. Of this, as of nearly all the major problems of the future in India, it is certain that no conceivable settlement will escape vehement criticism from one quarter or another. Mr. "Age" modestly disclaims constructive originality, but he ends on a note of hopefulness—confident that courage and good faith, honesty and clear thinking in co-operation with Indians will enable us to lay a safe course through all dangers and difficulties. The observations on communal electorates and on the services, civil and military, are sound and interesting. Few, however, will be found to agree with his suggestion that the police services should be centralised under imperial administration. No province would ever agree to surrender control over a service so intimately concerned with the daily life of its people.

Mr. Panikkar's book has been highly and deservedly praised in a foreword by Lord Olivier. He traces the various stages by which the status of the British power in India became gradually transformed from that of a partner on equal terms with allied sovereign States to that of the paramount power invested with authority commensurate with its universal and sovereign responsibility for the welfare of India as a whole. The British Government became the Government of India, and it is in this sense that it can most truly claim to be the inheritor of the dominion of the Moghuls. It is only by virtue of this sovereign responsibility that the power of the Central Government has in a natural and inevitable evolution encroached upon the sovereign independence of even the most ancient and powerful Indian States. The welfare of India demanded peace and the substitution of arbitration for war. It demanded also unified and central control in all such matters as foreign relations, defence, railways, posts and telegraphs, currency and tariffs. In Asia, as in Europe, the most solemn treaties must become obsolete if the surrounding and underlying conditions become radically transformed. In the rapidly changing India of the decades which followed the Mutiny, the ancient treaties, made when John Company was not even *primus inter pares*, could no longer regulate the relations between the States and the Central Power. The letter of the treaties had to be supplemented by new conventions and principles which were worked out to suit the new requirements. All this is clearly brought out by Mr. Panikkar, though he sometimes uses language about the rights of the major States to "absolute internal independence" which at first sight might appear inconsistent. But the careful reader will find that in Mr. Panikkar's view the watchful supervision of the Government of India to prevent misrule and abuse of power is "not an encroachment on the rights of the States but a safe-guarding of their position."

Finally, Mr. Panikkar shows how, in the new world system ushered in by the Great War, both India and the Indian States have gained in influence and dignity. India sends a delegation to Geneva and the States as such are separately recognised in the Imperial Conference. The stage is now clear for the next great transformation—the federation of the whole of India in one national system. The future welfare of India must depend very largely on the use which the princes will

make of their opportunities. They are supported by the immemorial Eastern veneration for the personal ruler. This will be denied by those who argue that many of the princes are aliens who owe their thrones to diplomatic adroitness or to the fortunes of war, and that they have no real hold on the affection and loyalty of their subjects. But the history of our own royal family has shown how quickly an alien may take root in the country of his adoption. A prince who is venerated as the custodian of the cultural traditions of his people might aim at embodying in a living polity the ideals which inspire Rabindranath Tagore's work at Dholpur—a synthesis of the finest elements in the civilisations of East and West.

"*Quicquid dehrant reges plectuntur Achivi.*" While Mr. Panikkar's book deals with the princes, Mr. Mukerjee's theme is the "*Achivi*," the humble labouring masses of the peasant population whose welfare is the indispensable condition of national prosperity. In post-War Europe the so-called "Green Rising" has brought about an immense regeneration, economic, social and political, of the peasantry. Mr. Mukerjee's book is a welcome indication that the Indian peasant also may see the dawning of a similar day. It should be in the hands of every Indian Minister responsible for the wide range of rural problems which are here discussed and illustrated by facts and experience drawn not only from India but from all over the world. He would learn that for the establishment of a healthy system of "Permanent Agriculture," as defined by Mr. Mukerjee, he must be equipped with all the resources of modern science and technology. The sociologist and the chemist, the biologist and the agricultural engineer must all make their contributions. The author's diagnosis of the causes of Indian poverty and his numerous detailed suggestions for the remedial measures required for building up the welfare of the peasant and the welfare of the Land and Water by which he lives, are of extraordinary interest and value. Philosophic breadth of view and vast stores of learning and information are combined with the intimate practical knowledge of the social worker who has a personal and first-hand knowledge of his subject.

F. G. PRATT.

Studies: Indian and Islamic. By S. KHUDA BUKHSH, M.A., B.C.L. 1927. (London: Kegan Paul. 8vo. 275 pp. 10s. 6d. net.)

AMONG Muslim Indian scholars Mr. Khuda Bukhsh is an outstanding figure. Observing that, in spite of the progress of Western methods of research, the studies of German scholars are still too much neglected in India, he has made it his aim to translate some of the most important of them for the benefit of his fellow-students. To the hostile criticisms of many of his own community (fully explained, and possibly justified, by the character of some of Mr. Khuda Bukhsh's comments) he replies in this book, explicitly in a short article entitled "My Critics," implicitly by devoting more than half of it to a translation of four valuable chapters from von Kremer's *Culturgeschichte des Orients*. These, though superseded at some points by later researches, may still be read with profit by all who are interested in the history of Muhammadan culture, and our debt to Mr. Khuda Bukhsh is the greater that the original is now almost unprocurable. The remaining chapters of the book are reprints of various fugitive articles. The first twelve consist of reviews of English and German

publications, together with a few original studies on aspects of Islamic culture. The chapter on Muhammad deserves special notice, as a statement of the views held by an enlightened modern Muslim. The last few chapters deal mainly with Indian affairs. The impression they leave on the reader's mind is somewhat chaotic. It would be interesting to have the dates of the original articles, and still more interesting to know how far they reflect any large section of Muhammadan opinion in India.

H. A. R. GIBB.

Europa Year Book, 1927. Edited by MICHAEL FARBMAN, RAMSAY MUIR, HUGH F. SPENDER. 1927. (London: Europa Publishing Co. 8vo. xx+642 pp. 15s.)

THE *Europa Year Book* for 1927 is a considerable improvement on the volume for 1926. It has become frankly a work of reference, and it has added a number of new features, such as an account of the organisation of the Vatican. Each section shows marks of revision and is richer in detail. But there is still room for progress. The "Who's Who," to which so much importance is attached in the preface, still leaves the impression that the editors have never asked themselves who will use it and for what purposes. It remains arbitrary, not only in its inclusions and omissions, which is perhaps inevitable, but in its classifications and descriptions. Of a great many of the lists of learned men, it is not unfair to say that they mislead the ignorant, suggesting a false picture of who is doing work and who is the man to whom to apply for advice. Fuller notes restricted to a smaller sphere would prove of more real help. Further, too much care cannot be taken to make reference books accurate and consistent. A few instances of these weaknesses must close a notice which is critical because the *Europa Year Book* is plainly destined to become a useful and permanent book:

Professor Davis succeeded Professor Firth in the Regius Professorship of History at Oxford in 1925. Suleiman Nazif, the writer, and Kemal Bey, the architect, are dead. The Turkish Tribunals of Independence are not "copied from the Cheka in Russia" but from the special Turkish Tribunals of 1909. Papini is omitted from Italian writers, Madelin and Batiffol from French historians, of whom only seven are mentioned, two of them with nothing but a surname, a birth year and the words "Prof. Paris Faculty of Letters." Each of these points is slight in itself, but they have been taken at random and the list might be made very long.

A History of the Jewish People. By MAX L. MARGOLIS and ALEXANDER MARX. 1927. (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America. 8vo. xxi + 823 pp. \$4.)

I WAS once asked by an aggressive anti-Semite why I worked on English and not on Jewish history. I replied, "because we have no history, only a martyrology, and that is not amusing"—*Quæ regio in terris nostri non plena doloris*? The writing of a history of the Jewish people is indeed an extraordinary undertaking. One need not go the whole fundamentalist length with the publishers of this book, who, on the paper wrapper, state that it extends "From Creation to the present day." The first authentic record in which the Jews are

named is the inscription on an Egyptian monument wherein a Pharaoh declares that he has utterly and definitely exterminated them. From there onwards the threads of Jewish history run through practically all the world's records, making, almost throughout, the same pattern of sufferings and survival. As individuals partaking of the life of other nations, Jews have shared in their creative work, and sometimes even in the rewards and honours; as a nation, riveted to the Book, our main achievement has been survival at a price as unequalled as the achievement itself. This book gives a record of the long and weary road and must be welcomed as most useful in its brevity and completeness; it is written in a matter-of-fact, one might almost say, an unimaginative manner; and moves quickly along the road, for there is such a length of it to be covered. Martyrs' deaths fill every chapter, and beside them apostasies and silent defections which can be easily understood and forgiven, and which anyhow do not matter. It is said in Isaiah, that "only a branch shall survive." What is the future of that branch—shall it be a tree once more? The book ends on a hopeful note, unknown among Jews for almost two thousand years. We are to have a National Home, and live a life with contents better than mere survival. This is the concluding paragraph of the book:

"The foundation for Jewish cultural revival in Palestine was laid by the creation of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. On April 1, 1925, it was formally opened by Lord Balfour. . . . The address of the High Commissioner closed with the Hebrew benediction: 'Blessed be He who hath kept us alive to reach this day!'"

L. B. NAMIER.

L'Organisation Politique de la Grèce d'après la Constitution Republicaine du 29 septembre, 1925. By ALEXANDRE C. DJIRAS. 1927. (Librairie Picart. 8vo. 135 pp. and Appendix.)

THIS work represents a thesis, written by the author for the Faculty of Law in the University of Paris as a qualification for his degree as Doctor of Law. The subject chosen deals with previous Greek constitutions in general, and then goes on to describe in detail the present Constitution of the Greek Republic.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the Parliament and the second with the Government. In the former, a detailed statement is made on the composition of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and on the organisation of the Greek Parliament and its powers; while in the latter the statutes governing the functions of the President and Ministers are fully described. The Appendix gives the text of the Greek Constitution of the 29th September, 1925. In a short conclusion, the author describes how the Greek Constitution has the character of a composite work, how it preserves as far as possible the customs of the monarchy while at the same time incorporating many of the constitutional ideas of Great Britain and France.

The book is valuable as a study of constitutional law, and as a work of reference should take its place in the libraries of Europe. Apart from this, the work has no significance in the study of international affairs. The author has included a short bibliography.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

The New Balkans. By HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. With an introduction by ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE. 1927. (London and New York : Harper & Brothers. 8vo. 179 pp., Maps. 8s. 6d.)

THE chief value of this short and comprehensive survey of certain important situations in the Balkan Peninsula lies in the fact that the author presents his facts in "tabloid" form. Mr. Armstrong gives his readers the essential points, without going into much detail, and he has certainly succeeded in providing a useful handbook to present-day Balkan questions. Such a book should specially appeal to a large number of readers, who want to grasp quickly the essential points of complicated international problems without wading through masses of detailed narrative. In a few pages he discusses Yugoslav unity, the Fiume question, the Adriatic railway, the future of Albania, the unredeemed islands of Greece, the Salonica dispute, Bulgaria and the Ægean, and the dispute over Bessarabia—all questions of major importance in the "tangled skein" of Near Eastern politics. It is perhaps rather a pity that the author has not paid more attention to style which, in a book of this kind, should excel in clarity.

The author, although perhaps rather imbued with the doctrine of "self-determination," confines himself mainly to facts and only makes very general suggestions as regards the future. In discussing the possibilities of a Balkan Pact, Mr. Armstrong writes : "When the moment arrives for the Balkan nations to join together in a Pact of non-aggression, they should steer clear alike from assuming commitments outside the peninsula and from allowing foreign interference in their dealings with one another." While admitting the wisdom of such a policy, it is difficult to see how it can be carried into effect, as it seems much more likely that the destinies of the Balkan States will be settled by the Great Powers than that they themselves will combine against foreign interference. Prosperity is one of the surest foundations of peace, and for economic reasons small nations must rely on the influence of their more powerful neighbours.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

A Little Book of the League of Nations, 1920-27. By B. BRADFIELD. 1927. (London : P. S. King & Son. 8vo. 106 pp. 2s. net.)

LITTLE sketches, with a popular appeal, of the workings of the League at Geneva and its achievements throughout the world. The author's position of "Press Correspondent at Geneva" guarantees his familiarity with his subject, and every page shows his enthusiasm for it.

Europäische Zollunion. By DR. HANNS HEIMAN. 1926. (Berlin : Verlag von Reimar Hobbing. 8vo. 278 pp.)

A series of essays on the advantages and possibilities, or the reverse, of a European Customs Union. The contributors are in most cases German or Austrian Professors, higher officials or members of the Reichswirtschaftsrat. The book has the merits and defects of its form. There is much unnecessary repetition, and a single argument can never be fully developed : thus we are left hesitating between the rival theses of Dr. Gothein, who would begin with a Franco-German Union, Count Kalckreuth, who urges a union between Germany and her Eastern neighbours, and Dr. Eulenburg, who will have no union

at all. On the other hand, arguments (on both sides) are brought forward which might not have occurred to the author of a single treatise, and some of the essays cast interesting sidelights on the central problem: we may cite the first, on earlier attempts to form a European Customs Union, that of Herr Eggert on the Trade Unionist point of view, and that of Dr. Tschinersky on the position of International Cartels. It should be noted that the book was issued in the year preceding the Economic Conference of the League of Nations.

Money. By KARL HELFFERICH. Translated by LOUIS LITFELD. 1927. (London: Ernest Benn. 2 vols. 8vo. xiv + 340; 343-660 pp. 52s. 6d. net.)

THIS volume is a translation of the latest edition of Dr. Helfferich's monumental work, and the theoretical and historical chapters of the earlier editions are here supplemented by a particularly interesting section on the inflationist policy pursued by Germany during and after the War. Not all economists will agree with the author's views, which are admittedly contrary to those of the classic English school, in their defence, qualified as it is, of the policy of the Reichsbank; but all must admit Dr. Helfferich's peculiar qualifications for treating "changes in the value of money" from within, and even were the rest of the monumental volumes unwritten, their concluding chapters would remain a most important document for the financial history of Germany, and of Europe, after the War.

How Europe made Peace without America. By FRANK H. SIMONDS. 1927. (London: William Heinemann; New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. 8vo. viii + 407 pp. 21s.)

AN interesting survey of the post-War situation in Europe by a distinguished and well-informed American journalist. The book, though it does not add anything to our knowledge, is well worth reading because of its sympathetic appreciation of European difficulties and its frank criticism of the American attitude.

Slavery or "Sacred Trust"? By J. H. HARRIS. 1926. (London: Williams and Norgate. 8vo. xii + 195 pp. 5s.)

THIS book, written as "a challenge to existing colonial systems," is propaganda for the paramount interest of native races in tropical lands. Propaganda of the best sort, however, for it is good-humoured, well-documented, and free from vain pretence of impartiality. It is based upon a historic sketch of slavery under Western government and its evolution to the labour and land problems of to-day. Mr. Harris is an optimist, pinning his faith to the mandatory system, the Slavery Convention of 1926, and the labour code now being wrought at Geneva.

The main criticism against the book is that it is rather scrappy. A comparison of different methods of slave emancipation and their social and economic effects would have been valuable. It is tantalising to find a whole chapter on emancipation in Nepal, and nothing about the French Empire, a detailed account of Portuguese forced labour and nothing about the Dutch system. But more detail might have rendered the book less readable, and readable it certainly is.

FREDA WHITE.

FURTHER BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW

- Explaining China.* By JOHN EARL BAKER. 1927. (London: A. M. Philpot. 8vo. xviii + 312 pp. 15s.)
- Oil Imperialism.* By LOUIS FISCHER. 1927. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 8vo. 256 pp. 7s. 6d.)
- Lenin and Ghandi.* By RENÉ FULOP-MILLER. 1927. (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 8vo. xi + 343 pp. 21s.)
- Nigeria under British Rule.* By SIR W. NEVILL M. GEARY. 1927. (London: Methuen. 8vo. vii + 312 pp. 16s.)
- Seven Years in Southern Abyssinia.* By A. WEINHOLT HODSON. 1927. (London: Ernest Benn. 8vo. xv + 277 pp. 18s.)
- A Short History of Western Civilization.* By Professor A. F. HATTERSLEY. 1927. (London: Cambridge University Press. 8vo. ix + 245 pp. 6s.)
- Protestant Europe: Its Crisis and Outlook.* By ADOLF KELLER and GEORGE STEWART. 1927. (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 8vo. 385 pp. 20s.)
- The International Accounts.* By CLEONA LEWIS. 1927. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 8vo. x + 170 pp. 10s.)
- U.S.S.R.* By IVY LEE. 1927. (London: Ernest Benn. 8vo. 192 pp. 6s.)
- India and the West.* By F. S. MARVIN. 1927. (London: Longmans Green. 8vo. viii + 182 pp. 7s. 6d.)
- Defence of the West.* By HENRI MASSIS. (Trs. by F. S. FLINT.) 1927. (London: Faber & Gwyer. 8vo. xi + 215 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Mediterranean and its Problems.* By Major E. W. POLSON NEWMAN. 1927. (London: A. M. Philpot. 8vo. xiv + 327 pp. 15s.)
- The British Connection with India.* By K. T. PAUL. 1927. (London: Student Christian Movement. 8vo. 223 pp. 5s.)
- The Chinese Puzzle.* By ARTHUR RANSOME. 1927. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 8vo. 189 pp. 5s.)
- Kenya from Within.* By W. MCGREGOR ROSS. 1927. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 8vo. 486 pp. 18s.)
- In the Country of the Blue Nile.* By C. F. REY. 1927. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 296 pp. 25s.)
- The History of European Liberalism.* By GUIDO DE RUGGIERO. (Trs. by R. G. COLLINGWOOD.) 1927. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 476 pp. 16s.)
- The Challenge of Islam.* By SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH. 1927. (London: Witherby. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.)
- Re-Forging America.* By LOTHROP STODDARD. 1927. (London: Charles Scribner. 8vo. 389 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- China and the Nations.* By CHING-WAI WONG. 1927. (London: Martin Hopkinson. 8vo. xxiv + 141 pp. 7s. 6d.)
- Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile.* By HENRY LANE WILSON. 1927. (London: A. M. Philpot. 8vo. xvii + 399 pp. 15s.)

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formerly Belgian Foreign Minister. 1924. (*Reprinted
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